5 ms·
> AES-256 is doomed to fail, but we have made the chance of failure miniscule That doesn't make sense. AES makes the cost and time length of a successful attac
by plonk 4y ago
> AES-256 is doomed to fail, but we have made the chance of failure miniscule
That doesn't make sense. AES makes the cost and time length of a successful attack too expensive to be worth attempting. It's very successful in that regard and might stay that way forever.
> But could we engineer one that has a 99.99999% chance not to fail after 1 year?
Do you see a way of doing that?
- charcircuit 4y ago>AES makes the cost and time length of a successful attack too expensive That's my point. Can we make the cost and time lengthe of a successful attack to be too expensive. >Do you see a way of doing that? Having more diverse collateral as part of the algorithm. Using rebasing to help recover the peg.
- plonk 4y ago> That's my point. Can we make the cost and time lengthe of a successful attack to be too expensive. What's the use of a peg that is likely to break after one year though? Symmetric ciphers are basically a solved problem until a computing revolution, this doesn't seem to be nearly as easy.