> I suggest much of what large pre-trained models do is a form of artificial mimicry. Rather than stochastic parrots, we might call them stochastic chameleons.

> I suggest much of what large pre-trained models do is a form of artificial mimicry. Rather than stochastic parrots, we might call them stochastic chameleons. Parrots repeat canned phrases; chameleons seamlessly blend in new environments. The difference might seem, ironically, a matter of semantics. However, it is significant when it comes to highlighting the capacities, limitations, and potential risks of large pre-trained models. Their ability to adapt to the content, tone, and style of virtually any prompt is what makes them so impressive—and potentially harmful. > Here’s the thing about mimicry: It need not involve intelligence, or even agency. The specialized pigment-containing cells through which chameleons and cephalopods blend in their environments may seem clever, but they don’t require them to intentionally imitate features of their surroundings through careful analysis. The author thinks reducing models to a parrot is too lowly, because in his conception parrots are just dumbasses who repeat phrases at random apparently. So he invents the term "stochastic chameleons", which is a downgrade - parrots are much smarter, and language is far more complicated than the adaptations chameleons and cephalopods do. But the heavy-lifting comes down to the term "intentionality", which pervades the entire article. The author equates intelligence to intentionality, a big mistake. Another issue is this constant bemoaning of models as susceptible to human biases. Language models can be trained to be racist, sexist or hateful - so what? What does this have to do with mimicry and intelligence?