3 ms·

Interestingly, it's the line operator that usually has to establish and maintain those according to federal and (whatever) state guidelines might exist.

by kodah 4y ago

cagey 4y ago
I believe that this is incorrectly simplistic, if only because these sorts of situations by definition exist at the interface between a railroad and either a private or government road. Having the line operator (which I'm taking to mean railroad owner, in this case BNSF) bear 100% of the burden of providing full crossing protection creates an unbalanced situation (in terms of the cost to be borne). I'm not an expert, but have been following a forum thread on this topic (this Amtrak-truck collision and how to prevent repeats)[0] which points to articles stating that this particular crossing has been "on the list" of not the RR owner (BNSF) but MODOT (Missouri [state] Dept of Transportation) for receiving a "crossing gates and lights" (automated protection) deployment, and that the cost of this prospective deployment is approximately USD400K (per crossing) which would be shared by the state (MODOT) and BNSF, and that, as noted by others posting in this thread, there are a large number (probably the majority) of RR/road crossings in the state (and country) which are similarly unprotected, and whose low use rate has historically not justified the installation and ongoing maintenance costs of full crossing protection. A cynic on the linked[0] thread mentioned it was possible that MODOT had put every unprotected RR/road crossing "on the list" to receive a full protection equipment deployment, so that in case of any similar accident, they could claim to "already be working on a solution, just didn't get there in time" as in bureaucratic CYA. Given the costs involved, IMO it would probably be better to close at least half of the crossings in (e.g. relatively flat farmland) areas where the road grid incurs these crossings at a rate more than one per mile. But as with decisions to spend money, choosing which crossings to close (ostensibly so that the remainder may have automated protection added) becomes a political "hot potato" that can easily cause the process to stall. [0] https://cs.trains.com/trn/f/111/t/292768.aspx https://cs.trains.com/trn/f/111/t/292768.aspx [1] https://www.kansascity.com/news/state/missouri/article263049938.html https://www.kansascity.com/news/state/missouri/article263049...
- mindslight 4y ago
  This cost sharing hot potato is itself part of the problem. It's ridiculous to have privately-owned infrequently-used tracks having precedence over well-used public roads, and then making mitigating the resulting contention into a shared responsibility. It's akin to someone putting up a yield sign on the road next to their driveway, and then just pulling out without caring because they technically own up until the center of the road. Rather BNSF et al should be paying for the full cost of their own infrastructure, either by building out the necessary safety devices or simply ending the full-speed aspect of the crossings they don't want to pay for. And I say this as someone who like trains, has taken the Southwest Chief cross country a few times, and wishes we had more passenger rail in general.
  - cagey 4y ago
    The RR line on which the collision near Mendon, MO occurred is the furthest thing from "infrequently-used tracks"; these tracks are part of the "BNSF Southern Transcon[tinental]" line[0] between Los Angeles, CA and Chicago, IL, which carries (per previously linked Trains Forum thread: "Posted by tree68 on Thursday, June 30, 2022 7:59 PM") "The FRA/DOT crossing data shows over 50 trains a day..." (wikipedia[0] provides a higher number). And the vast majority of the BNSF Southern Transcon in MO (and elsewhere) is double-tracked, meaning trains can (and usually do) run near full track speed (90 mph in my understanding) without the frequent need to stop for opposing-direction traffic as would be typical on single-track lines. Also, I don't know if you were applying the term to the road of the crossing involved in this crash, but this road is not one I would characterize as "well used"; more like "exceedingly rarely used" (thus the lack of active crossing protection). Finally according to the previously referenced Trains Forum thread ("Posted by blue streak 1 on Wednesday, June 29, 2022 11:32 AM"), the railroad existed 60-70 years prior to the road in question. I believe it is this circumstance which places the onus on MODOT to defend the users of their later-arriving road from hazards associated with rail traffic on the preexisting BNSF line (with BNSF being an involved party). I understand citing posts another public forum does not necessarily meet the gold standard of citations, but all of these facts align with my preexisting understanding of the situation. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Transcon https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Transcon calls out Mendon, MO as a station on the Marceline subdivision

Interestingly, it's the line operator that usually has to establish and maintain those according to federal and (whatever) state guidelines might exist.

by kodah 4y ago

Interestingly, it's the line operator that usually has to establish and maintain those according to federal and (whatever) state guidelines might exist.

cagey 4y ago

I believe that this is incorrectly simplistic, if only because these sorts of situations by definition exist at the interface between a railroad and either a private or government road. Having the line operator (which I'm taking to mean railroad owner, in this case BNSF) bear 100% of the burden of providing full crossing protection creates an unbalanced situation (in terms of the cost to be borne). I'm not an expert, but have been following a forum thread on this topic (this Amtrak-truck collision and how to prevent repeats)[0] which points to articles stating that this particular crossing has been "on the list" of not the RR owner (BNSF) but MODOT (Missouri [state] Dept of Transportation) for receiving a "crossing gates and lights" (automated protection) deployment, and that the cost of this prospective deployment is approximately USD400K (per crossing) which would be shared by the state (MODOT) and BNSF, and that, as noted by others posting in this thread, there are a large number (probably the majority) of RR/road crossings in the state (and country) which are similarly unprotected, and whose low use rate has historically not justified the installation and ongoing maintenance costs of full crossing protection. A cynic on the linked[0] thread mentioned it was possible that MODOT had put every unprotected RR/road crossing "on the list" to receive a full protection equipment deployment, so that in case of any similar accident, they could claim to "already be working on a solution, just didn't get there in time" as in bureaucratic CYA. Given the costs involved, IMO it would probably be better to close at least half of the crossings in (e.g. relatively flat farmland) areas where the road grid incurs these crossings at a rate more than one per mile. But as with decisions to spend money, choosing which crossings to close (ostensibly so that the remainder may have automated protection added) becomes a political "hot potato" that can easily cause the process to stall. [0] https://cs.trains.com/trn/f/111/t/292768.aspx https://cs.trains.com/trn/f/111/t/292768.aspx [1] https://www.kansascity.com/news/state/missouri/article263049938.html https://www.kansascity.com/news/state/missouri/article263049...

mindslight 4y ago
This cost sharing hot potato is itself part of the problem. It's ridiculous to have privately-owned infrequently-used tracks having precedence over well-used public roads, and then making mitigating the resulting contention into a shared responsibility. It's akin to someone putting up a yield sign on the road next to their driveway, and then just pulling out without caring because they technically own up until the center of the road. Rather BNSF et al should be paying for the full cost of their own infrastructure, either by building out the necessary safety devices or simply ending the full-speed aspect of the crossings they don't want to pay for. And I say this as someone who like trains, has taken the Southwest Chief cross country a few times, and wishes we had more passenger rail in general.
- cagey 4y ago
  The RR line on which the collision near Mendon, MO occurred is the furthest thing from "infrequently-used tracks"; these tracks are part of the "BNSF Southern Transcon[tinental]" line[0] between Los Angeles, CA and Chicago, IL, which carries (per previously linked Trains Forum thread: "Posted by tree68 on Thursday, June 30, 2022 7:59 PM") "The FRA/DOT crossing data shows over 50 trains a day..." (wikipedia[0] provides a higher number). And the vast majority of the BNSF Southern Transcon in MO (and elsewhere) is double-tracked, meaning trains can (and usually do) run near full track speed (90 mph in my understanding) without the frequent need to stop for opposing-direction traffic as would be typical on single-track lines. Also, I don't know if you were applying the term to the road of the crossing involved in this crash, but this road is not one I would characterize as "well used"; more like "exceedingly rarely used" (thus the lack of active crossing protection). Finally according to the previously referenced Trains Forum thread ("Posted by blue streak 1 on Wednesday, June 29, 2022 11:32 AM"), the railroad existed 60-70 years prior to the road in question. I believe it is this circumstance which places the onus on MODOT to defend the users of their later-arriving road from hazards associated with rail traffic on the preexisting BNSF line (with BNSF being an involved party). I understand citing posts another public forum does not necessarily meet the gold standard of citations, but all of these facts align with my preexisting understanding of the situation. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Transcon https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Transcon calls out Mendon, MO as a station on the Marceline subdivision