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Most of the examples mentioned in the article already require your identity (opening bank account, tax return, etc). Others are outright creepy. You can't acce

by cm2187 4y ago

Most of the examples mentioned in the article already require your identity (opening bank account, tax return, etc). Others are outright creepy. You can't access medecine without verifying your ID? That locks lots of people out of access to healthcare (illegals, tourists, etc). Age verification? So porn websites will store the real id of all their visitors (or alternatively a central EU age verification system will be notified every time you visit such a website)? In France for instance it is illegal to identify people by their social security number in a system (at least it was 20 years ago). That's a safeguard to prevent it from making it too easy to correlate an identity across many systems. This ID scheme will go around that. To be honest I think that law was passed at a time where surveillance was still considered evil. I think governements of most liberal democracies today are actually entertaining stasi-style surveillance as a greater good.

wewxjfq 4y ago
Age verification already works with the current digital IDs and it's made in a way that doesn't leak your personal data. In general you get to see what personal data is being requested before you agree to transmit it. The IDs can also create pseudonyms, so different systems don't know that you are the same person. I opted out of the digital functions of my ID, but I plan to have them activated, because it's better than video identification or uploading scans of my documents. That being said, I hope that only serious processes will adopt this.
- zeeZ 4y ago
  In the context of German ID cards, this is mostly correct. For age verification requests, the service provider can set the amount of years, and the ID card will simply answer with a yes or no. The pseudonym isn't created, but calculated from the ID's private key and the service provider's public key, so even a new card means new pseudonym, which makes it slightly less useful for login long term.
M2Ys4U 4y ago
>Others are outright creepy. You can't access medecine without verifying your ID? That locks lots of people out of access to healthcare (illegals, tourists, etc). Does it not make sense that prescription medication can only be picked up by somebody who has been prescribed that medication (or somebody who has been delegated that authority by the prescribee)? As long as there's an offline mechanism available for verification I don't see the problem here. >Age verification? So porn websites will store the real id of all their visitors (or alternatively a central EU age verification system will be notified every time you visit such a website)? Presenting a token verifying that one is over 18 is not the same thing as presenting one's entire identity so that the service can verify one is over 18. The way it could work is this: You try and access an age-restricted service (ARS). It returns a request for age verification including a unique ID. You then pass a hash of that request to the age verification service (AVS), and get back a token which is signed by the AVS. That token is then presented to the ARS, which validates that the signature and that the hash of their request are valid. Boom, you have just verified that you are over 18 without leaking your identity to the ARS and without leaking the ARS's identity to the AVS.
- cm2187 4y ago
  All you have done is to move the juicy log file to the AVS, haven't you?
  - M2Ys4U 4y ago
    All the AVS knows is that you're asking for an age verification token for something, but it doesn't know what the token will be used for as that information was collapsed in to a hash by you. I'm sure there could be some sort of more elaborate protocol that would preserve privacy in the case of a log breach, the one I sketched out just shows that (assuming logs remain private and there's no collusion) that the ARS doesn't need to know the user's identity and the AVS doesn't need to know the ARS's identity in order to validate the user's age.

by cm2187 4y ago

wewxjfq 4y ago

Age verification already works with the current digital IDs and it's made in a way that doesn't leak your personal data. In general you get to see what personal data is being requested before you agree to transmit it. The IDs can also create pseudonyms, so different systems don't know that you are the same person. I opted out of the digital functions of my ID, but I plan to have them activated, because it's better than video identification or uploading scans of my documents. That being said, I hope that only serious processes will adopt this.

zeeZ 4y ago
In the context of German ID cards, this is mostly correct. For age verification requests, the service provider can set the amount of years, and the ID card will simply answer with a yes or no. The pseudonym isn't created, but calculated from the ID's private key and the service provider's public key, so even a new card means new pseudonym, which makes it slightly less useful for login long term.

M2Ys4U 4y ago

>Others are outright creepy. You can't access medecine without verifying your ID? That locks lots of people out of access to healthcare (illegals, tourists, etc). Does it not make sense that prescription medication can only be picked up by somebody who has been prescribed that medication (or somebody who has been delegated that authority by the prescribee)? As long as there's an offline mechanism available for verification I don't see the problem here. >Age verification? So porn websites will store the real id of all their visitors (or alternatively a central EU age verification system will be notified every time you visit such a website)? Presenting a token verifying that one is over 18 is not the same thing as presenting one's entire identity so that the service can verify one is over 18. The way it could work is this: You try and access an age-restricted service (ARS). It returns a request for age verification including a unique ID. You then pass a hash of that request to the age verification service (AVS), and get back a token which is signed by the AVS. That token is then presented to the ARS, which validates that the signature and that the hash of their request are valid. Boom, you have just verified that you are over 18 without leaking your identity to the ARS and without leaking the ARS's identity to the AVS.

cm2187 4y ago
All you have done is to move the juicy log file to the AVS, haven't you?
- M2Ys4U 4y ago
  All the AVS knows is that you're asking for an age verification token for something, but it doesn't know what the token will be used for as that information was collapsed in to a hash by you. I'm sure there could be some sort of more elaborate protocol that would preserve privacy in the case of a log breach, the one I sketched out just shows that (assuming logs remain private and there's no collusion) that the ARS doesn't need to know the user's identity and the AVS doesn't need to know the ARS's identity in order to validate the user's age.