Money does have a critical characteristic: fungibility, its defining technological function. Putin stays in power primarily by redistributing kopecks. But unlik

Money does have a critical characteristic: fungibility, its defining technological function. Putin stays in power primarily by redistributing kopecks. But unlike, say, land, kopecks are fungible; this moderates and limits his power. People can flee with kopecks. People can transfer kopecks to others without Putin's knowledge or say-so, manipulating social networks beyond Putin's direct control. The power of modern authoritarians is in many ways much more precarious and circumscribed than in earlier eras. This precariousness is compounded by international trade, making the value of kopecks at least partly dependent on economic performance. (In a perfectly insular economy, Putin would have much more control over kopecks, including fungibility, but you can't regress to such insularity without destroying most wealth in the country.) Notably, Putin has plenty of kopecks stashed overseas, presumably partly out of concern for the precariousness of his situation, or at least that of his family's fortunes. Money isn't power, per se. Control over social media isn't power, per se. Voting isn't power, per se. But it's difficult to discuss power without discussing the mediums by which it's exercised and allotted. In particular, power exercised through one medium might not be readily transferred to another medium.