4 ms·

> We usually feel like there is a person inside that has control and almost extra-physical ability to override, but surely this must be result of physical input

> We usually feel like there is a person inside that has control and almost extra-physical ability to override, but surely this must be result of physical inputs and processes? I know of no rigorous evidence against the idea that we're purely matter and physics, nor do I know of any rigorous evidence showing that's all there is to humans (or living beings generally). It's arguably a "mysticism of the gaps", but the "hard problem" form of consciousness still seems like a pretty weird outcome of evolution to me if that is in fact what it is, and not something that's adequately explained by, say, the anthropic principle. I realize opinions will vary, and I'm okay with that - this one happens to be mine at the moment. It seems to me to require a decent amount of faith in the idea that only matter exists to conclude that consciousness and free will must be illusory. It's certainly a defensible, reasonable stance, but I don't think it's the only plausible one. > There have also been some (contentious) scientific experiments pointing towards this. If you're referring to Libet's analysis of the Bereitschaftspotential experiments, there has been some acceptance in the past few years that this paper shows he misinterpreted the data: https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1210467109 https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1210467109 Popular summary of the debate in The Atlantic: https://archive.ph/SHH0p https://archive.ph/SHH0p

feanaro 4y ago
> It seems to me to require a decent amount of faith in the idea that only matter exists to conclude that consciousness and free will must be illusory. Why only matter? My default position (of which I'm not entirely convinced of!) is that there are only physical things, not that there is only matter. So if consciousness and free will are physical phenomena of some kind, that makes things logical again. But if they are physical, then surely they follow physical rules, and need to somehow interact with the rest of physics. This again leaves no gap for there to be a divine kind of free will, one that is extra-physical and capable of overriding cause and effect. When I say that free will is illusory, I mean it in this sense: I don't see a logically coherent way in which free will could be non-physical and outside of the usual cause-and-effect chain. ** I did mean Libet, thanks for the references.
- feanaro 4y ago
  > I did mean Libet, thanks for the references. And quickly skimming through the linked paper, their suggested mechanism changes the "decision" to simply be a result of stochastic fluctuation in neural activity. So it resolves some of the weirdness introduced by Libet, by not having the moment of decision precede the moment of conscious experience. But at best, it still leaves free will with a kind of ancillary role, in which it represents the "feeling" of volitional control, with the actual decision still being stochastic at best. This is certainly possible, but not what people usually mean when discussing free will colloquially (I find).

feanaro 4y ago

> It seems to me to require a decent amount of faith in the idea that only matter exists to conclude that consciousness and free will must be illusory. Why only matter? My default position (of which I'm not entirely convinced of!) is that there are only physical things, not that there is only matter. So if consciousness and free will are physical phenomena of some kind, that makes things logical again. But if they are physical, then surely they follow physical rules, and need to somehow interact with the rest of physics. This again leaves no gap for there to be a divine kind of free will, one that is extra-physical and capable of overriding cause and effect. When I say that free will is illusory, I mean it in this sense: I don't see a logically coherent way in which free will could be non-physical and outside of the usual cause-and-effect chain. ** I did mean Libet, thanks for the references.

feanaro 4y ago
> I did mean Libet, thanks for the references. And quickly skimming through the linked paper, their suggested mechanism changes the "decision" to simply be a result of stochastic fluctuation in neural activity. So it resolves some of the weirdness introduced by Libet, by not having the moment of decision precede the moment of conscious experience. But at best, it still leaves free will with a kind of ancillary role, in which it represents the "feeling" of volitional control, with the actual decision still being stochastic at best. This is certainly possible, but not what people usually mean when discussing free will colloquially (I find).