2 ms·
Anyone aware of any exploits tied the SHA-1 weakness in the wild? (I have seen proofs of concept [1], but never actually heard of an exploit in the wild using
by O__________O 4y ago
Anyone aware of any exploits tied the SHA-1 weakness in the wild?
(I have seen proofs of concept [1], but never actually heard of an exploit in the wild using it; for example, on: digital certificate signatures, email PGP/GPG signatures, software vendor signatures, software updates, ISO checksums, backup systems, deduplication systems, Git, etc.)
[1] https://shattered.io/ https://shattered.io/
- password4321 4y agoApplications of that collision: https://twitter.com/rauchg/status/834770508633694208 https://twitter.com/rauchg/status/834770508633694208 > a SHA-1 "Pinata" [...] claimed https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13723892 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13723892 > Make your own colliding PDFs https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13917990 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13917990 > Collision Detection
- bawolff 4y agoMost security critical systems have switched to sha256 at this point, and making a fresh collision still costs tens of thousands, so people arent really doing it for kicks (that said, once you have one collision you can reuse it for free as long as you keep the same prefix, so the proof of concept can be repurposed with certain constraints). The most in the wild one i have ever heard of was when webkit accidentally broke their svn repo by checking in a collision. However you can look at the history of md5 which had a similar flaw which was exploited by the flame malware.
- O__________O 4y agoThanks, agree the Flame’s use of a collision attack was both comparable and notable: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flame_(malware) https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flame_(malware)