3 ms·

But surely you see the difference between "revokable enterprise cert that requires a verification process to obtain" and "anyone can sideload"? I don't see thi

But surely you see the difference between "revokable enterprise cert that requires a verification process to obtain" and "anyone can sideload"? I don't see this as Apple making incompatible statements.

josephcsible 4y ago
But the verification is obviously ineffective at stopping malware. If it were effective, then this wouldn't be a story.
- mwint 4y ago
  Something can be simultaneously effective, and also fail at least once.
  - smoldesu 4y ago
    Sure, but as soon as you have that single failure, your system isn't flawless anymore. Apple's claims of comprehensive security are repeatedly proved wrong, and social engineering attacks like this indicate that their attack surface is larger than one might have initially realized.
    - reaperducer 4y ago
      Sure, but as soon as you have that single failure, your system isn't flawless anymore. I've never seen Apple claim that its system is flawless. Do you have a link?
- mh8h 4y ago
  The thing is that when the system is effective at stoping the malware, you don't get a signal about it. You only see the ones that somehow made it. So it's not easy to have an idea of the effectiveness.
cmeacham98 4y ago
Of course, I'll admit it will stop small-time attackers that aren't willing to pay $299, register a fake company, and whatever else is needed to trick Apple into letting you into the enterprise dev program. But I'd like to propose these attackers wouldn't have been able to bypass the sandbox anyways. I'm sure the fact this setup forces all apps to go through Apple's app store and pay them 30% of their revenue is just a unfortunate accident. My point is that if Apple truly believed sideloading was a risk to user security there wouldn't be certificates that let you sideload on all devices. They would force companies to provide a list of devices or only allow devices enrolled in their MDM or some similar reasonable restriction.
- acdha 4y ago
  > I'm sure the fact this setup forces all apps to go through Apple's app store and pay them 30% of their revenue is just a unfortunate accident. Does a normal enterprise charge its users to install internal apps? If not, this seems like an odd complaint. > My point is that if Apple truly believed sideloading was a risk to user security there wouldn't be certificates that let you sideload on all devices. They would force companies to provide a list of devices or only allow devices enrolled in their MDM or some similar reasonable restriction. That last part is effectively what they're doing: you have to do the same level of scary prompt and authentication to install an enterprise certificate as you do to enroll for MDM. Yes, users can still be socially engineered to compromise their device but that's an order of magnitude harder than just convincing someone to run some random binary.
  - Apocryphon 4y ago
    Apple can easily create a guarded sideloading experience replete with scary warnings. They can shape the sideloading UX to screen out users who aren't ready for it. Critics of iOS sideloading fail to see that Apple can add as many guards and guided experiences into sideloading as it does with its other features, such as installing enterprise certs. Even on Android with its openness and notoriety for security issues, to sideload APKs means having to navigate multiple settings menus to get to it, which screens out the majority of non-technical users. Though that is more playing to the "strength" of that platform (clunky design and unwieldiness), which Apple would not be doing.
zamalek 4y ago
To a layman? No difference at all. Remember that Apple claim to be the saviors of the ignorant.

josephcsible 4y ago

But the verification is obviously ineffective at stopping malware. If it were effective, then this wouldn't be a story.

mwint 4y ago
Something can be simultaneously effective, and also fail at least once.
- smoldesu 4y ago
  Sure, but as soon as you have that single failure, your system isn't flawless anymore. Apple's claims of comprehensive security are repeatedly proved wrong, and social engineering attacks like this indicate that their attack surface is larger than one might have initially realized.
  - reaperducer 4y ago
    Sure, but as soon as you have that single failure, your system isn't flawless anymore. I've never seen Apple claim that its system is flawless. Do you have a link?
mh8h 4y ago
The thing is that when the system is effective at stoping the malware, you don't get a signal about it. You only see the ones that somehow made it. So it's not easy to have an idea of the effectiveness.

cmeacham98 4y ago

Of course, I'll admit it will stop small-time attackers that aren't willing to pay $299, register a fake company, and whatever else is needed to trick Apple into letting you into the enterprise dev program. But I'd like to propose these attackers wouldn't have been able to bypass the sandbox anyways. I'm sure the fact this setup forces all apps to go through Apple's app store and pay them 30% of their revenue is just a unfortunate accident. My point is that if Apple truly believed sideloading was a risk to user security there wouldn't be certificates that let you sideload on all devices. They would force companies to provide a list of devices or only allow devices enrolled in their MDM or some similar reasonable restriction.

acdha 4y ago
> I'm sure the fact this setup forces all apps to go through Apple's app store and pay them 30% of their revenue is just a unfortunate accident. Does a normal enterprise charge its users to install internal apps? If not, this seems like an odd complaint. > My point is that if Apple truly believed sideloading was a risk to user security there wouldn't be certificates that let you sideload on all devices. They would force companies to provide a list of devices or only allow devices enrolled in their MDM or some similar reasonable restriction. That last part is effectively what they're doing: you have to do the same level of scary prompt and authentication to install an enterprise certificate as you do to enroll for MDM. Yes, users can still be socially engineered to compromise their device but that's an order of magnitude harder than just convincing someone to run some random binary.
- Apocryphon 4y ago
  Apple can easily create a guarded sideloading experience replete with scary warnings. They can shape the sideloading UX to screen out users who aren't ready for it. Critics of iOS sideloading fail to see that Apple can add as many guards and guided experiences into sideloading as it does with its other features, such as installing enterprise certs. Even on Android with its openness and notoriety for security issues, to sideload APKs means having to navigate multiple settings menus to get to it, which screens out the majority of non-technical users. Though that is more playing to the "strength" of that platform (clunky design and unwieldiness), which Apple would not be doing.

zamalek 4y ago

To a layman? No difference at all. Remember that Apple claim to be the saviors of the ignorant.