2 ms·
> Despite hosting multiple sites, SNI is not required. Hence I do not send api.call-cc.org in plaintext over the wire. And how do you verify that a man in the
by bawolff 4y ago
> Despite hosting multiple sites, SNI is not required. Hence I do not send api.call-cc.org in plaintext over the wire.
And how do you verify that a man in the middle attack is not in progress if the server is not serving the correct certificate?
I appreciate that active attacks are a bit harder than passive listening, but they are still rather trivial. You are proposing making figuring out the domain name slightly harder in exchange for allowing the entire connection to be eavesdropped.
This seems like an incredibly bad privacy trade off.
- 1vuio0pswjnm7 4y agoThe person operating api.call-cc.org is the same person who operates 3e8.org. Using the default certificate, with the SAN 3e8.org, is fine. For recreational web use, where I am not using a grahical browser and I am in fact sniffing the traffic myself, the tradeoff is acceptable. The probability of someone on path sniffing every domain name sent in the clear over the wire is high, IMO. It is too easy. I would bet on it. Of the sites that do not require SNI, I am using the default certificate. I am not particularly concerned about the person who controls the default certificate at that IP address being able to see the traffic for all the sites hosted at that address. The large CDNs do require SNI. Generally the ones that do not require SNI are at IP addresses that host only a small number of other sites. The only domain names this person can observe are the ones sent to _that IP address_. The person on path sniffing SNI would can see the domain names sent to _every IP address_. When using the web recreationally, for noncommercial purposes, I cannot see the point of going through the trouble to encrypt the non-confidential contents of web pages and at the same time expending no effort to not send domain names in the clear, and to encrypt SNI where possible. To me, comprehensive recretional browsing history _is_ worth encrypting, perhaps even more than the public web page contents. This is no different than HN users who wish to avoid "smart TVs" that log every program that their owners watch. And for anyone who believes that this evil person controlling the default certificate may be modifying the contents of web pages, then I can easily compare the contents to the same pages retrieved from Internet Archive or Common Crawl.