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>For example, let's imagine you invite an external guest for a presentation inside your company. You offer to connect to a video-projector so he can show his sl
by gruez 4y ago
>For example, let's imagine you invite an external guest for a presentation inside your company. You offer to connect to a video-projector so he can show his slides. This is the perfect opportunity for the guest to hack the video-projector. Next time an employee connects to this projector, his laptop is hacked back. And voila, the innocent guest managed to infiltrate your company network, and can exfiltrate confidential information.
This seems like a very unlikely attack vector. For one, you have to identify the projector used, develop an exploit for the projector (assuming it's even vulnerable), and also develop a projector for windows/mac/linux that allows the payload to spread. This seems like a lot of trouble to go through compared to visiting the office, "accidentally" leaving a usb drive/dongle, and hoping someone ends up using it. Bonus: usb dongles allow you to spoof input devices, so you don't even need to develop an exploit.
- rtkwe 4y agoYou might be able to get a persistent hack attacking the HDMI controller chip directly instead of having to develop one specific to each projector, that's a more generic component. That said though this does feel a bit like a very hypothetical attack because you'd have to package both an exploit for the projector and target
- ncmncm 4y agoIf your organization often gets outsiders in to present, it could slurp off the interesting contents of anything plugged in. Or, if you can get access to the projectors (or just the HDMI cables) at e.g. DEFCON. For certain selected targets, it might install something for later. Or maybe just everybody, and you only use the one on the target's machine, and ignore the rest. Note, you don't need to hack the projector. You just interpose between the computer and the projector, just like this thing does.
- bentcorner 4y agoDefense in depth - after you're done gluing USB and ethernet ports closed, this might be something to consider. I agree it's unlikely but if it's a low cost mitigation then why not? And if you're at a shop that doesn't do anything about open physical ports in the office then yes, this is way down on your risk assessment checklist. It's good education though. Much like there's danger in plugging your phone into random USB chargers, there's danger in plugging your PC into random HDMI cables. I didn't know that. It would be nice if there was a way it could preserve the EDID information without needed to manually clone it. It looks like this device is good for protecting the display, but I'd be more interested in a device that can protect my laptop when I travel.
- alerighi 4y agoUnless you are defending from the NSA or something like that, I don't think anyone has the resources to do that kind of attack, even if in theory it's possible. Also, if you have that level of paranoia, you probably don't invite people to present in your office. Yes, leaving around a USB drive would be easier, would also be easier to attach something to the first network port you can find, or attack some weak target in the network (for example, ask to use the printer to print something, and install something on them, printers are super vulnerable and the firmware gets never updated, also because the company that manages the printers is usually an external company with little knowledge about informatics in general).