Some issues with this report: > The challenge with using a blockchain is that one has to either (a) accept its immutability and trust that the programmers did

Some issues with this report: > The challenge with using a blockchain is that one has to either (a) accept its immutability and trust that the programmers did not introduce a bug, or (b) permit upgradeable contracts or off-chain code that share the same trust issues as a centralized approach. This paints the issue as binary, although there is more to it. Look at the WETH contract in which we both (a) accept its immutability and trust there are no bugs, but also (c) can migrate to a fork at a later point if desired through social consensus. There is another option (d) which is a less developed area: governance models that are not entirely centralized, see Uniswap and Aave. > The number of entities sufficient to disrupt a blockchain is relatively low: four for Bitcoin, two for Ethereum, and less than a dozen for most proof-of-stake networks. The Nakamoto coefficient relates to validator pools colluding to form a 51% attack. In Ethereum PoS this count is a bit higher, around 25-35[1]. Important to note the extreme costs of these attacks, and the defense mechanisms of PoS. If enough validators collude to 51% attack a PoS chain, users can follow a fork and have the attackers coins burned. Attacker would have to continually re-purchase coins to re-attack the new soft forks.[2] > For a blockchain to be optimally distributed, there must be a so-called Sybil cost. There is currently no known way to implement Sybil costs in a permissionless blockchain like Bitcoin or Ethereum without employing a centralized trusted third party (TTP). Until a mechanism for enforcing Sybil costs without a TTP is discovered, it will be almost impossible for permissionless blockchains to achieve satisfactory decentralization. This is based on the Kwon paper which defines "full decentralization" as a set of specific numerical constraints, and demonstrates that it is theoretically impossible for any permissionless system currently known to mankind to satisfy these constraints. Kwon makes no claims about whether this degree of decentralization is "satisfactory" or even necessary for a blockchain. A system that is distributed across thousands of nodes and highly resistant to 51% attacks and collusion is likely enough for it to be considered "decentralized" for practical purposes. [1] https://shsr2001.github.io/beacondigest/notebooks/2021/07/19/measuring_decentralization.html https://shsr2001.github.io/beacondigest/notebooks/2021/07/19... [2] https://vitalik.ca/general/2020/11/06/pos2020.html https://vitalik.ca/general/2020/11/06/pos2020.html