4 ms·
Let's look at another random example (I have a list of over 80,000 examples to choose from): 173.230.137.156 What is the domain name. This is a Linode IP. It
by 1vuio0pswjnm7 4y ago
Let's look at another random example (I have a list of over 80,000 examples to choose from): 173.230.137.156
What is the domain name.
This is a Linode IP. It hosts a few sites/endpoints.
Most TLS sites I access have multiple sites/endpoints hosted from the same IP address.
Thus a network observer who sees that IP address on the wire needs to figure out which site the user is accessing.
If we search for a certificate on crt.sh, there are no results. https://crt.sh/?q=173.230.137.156 https://crt.sh/?q=173.230.137.156
If we fetch the certificate from the IP address, it does not reveal all the sites/endpoints. It only reveals one: 3e8.org
echo|openssl s_client -connect 173.230.137.156:443 -showcerts |openssl x509 -text
The site does not support TLS1.3, so the certificate retrieved above can be sniffed for SANs on the wire. However as above it does not list all the sites/endpoints.
If we try reverse DNS, we get 3e8.org. Passive DNS data shows 3e8.org and the subdomains www and mail.
One of the other endpoints at this IP is api.call-cc.org.
It is possible to find that name by searching the IP at censys.io.
Despite hosting multiple sites, SNI is not required. Hence I do not send api.call-cc.org in plaintext over the wire.
echo -e 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: api.call-cc.org\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n"|openssl s_client -connect 173.230.137.156:443 -ign_eof -noservername
If the user sent SNI, the network observer has no work to do. She can see the exact domain name the user is accessing.
But without SNI she has to do work. She has to figure out if the user is accessing 3e8.org, www.3e8.org, api.call-cc.org or some other site.
Of course, with some detective work, this is possible. But it is not as easy as sniffing SNI.
By not sending SNI the user is not handing over a comprehensive list of every domain name accessed to ISPs, "tech" company intermediaries or others sniffing network traffic, as she would if using a "modern" browser to send HTTP requests directly to IP addresses.
One of things I like about Cloudflare's ESNI is that it is really fast. I am looking forward to the next iteration of a solution to the SNI privacy leak.
To follow the progress, check out https://defo.ie https://defo.ie
Anyone who thinks the SNI privacy "does not matter", who has no issue with handing over a comprehensive list of every domain name accessed to any party who is sniffing the wire, is encouraged to contact the folks working on encrypting SNI and tell them to stop. :)
- 1vuio0pswjnm7 4y agoPerhaps it is helpful to clarify what I mean when I use the phrase "SNI is not required" or "SNI is required". The meaning of those phrases to me may not be the same as the meaning of those phrases to web developers or people at large commercial CDNs that are trying to influence "upgrades" of traditional internet protocols that were originally developed by people at universities. What I mean by "SNI is not required" is that I can send an HTTP request over TLS without SNI and succesfully retrieve the resource I specified in the HTTP method line and Host header, e.g., if I send GET /index.html HTTP/1.1 Host: example.com Connection: close without SNI and I receive index.html then, to me, "SNI is not required". Whereas if I do not receive index.html unless I also send SNI, then, to me, "SNI is required". No one should interpret this phrase to indicate I do not understand the purpose behind SNI and why it exists. Nonetheless, I think the phrase is consistently misinterpreted. In the 173.230.137.156 example I chose, I can still retrieve /5/doc/index.html from api.call-cc.org regardless of whether I send SNI. Yes, the api.call-cc.org FQDN name does have its own certificate. But I can send no SNI, I can send SNI "example.com" or I can send SNI "3e8.org" and in every case I can still retrieve /5/doc/index.html (using the certificate for 3e8.org for the public key, etc., the default certificate sent by the httpd at IP address 173.230.137.156). In this example, the operator of the httpd is not checking the SNI against the Host header. Thus, to me, "SNI is not required" for this website. It does not matter whether there is one site hosted at the IP address, a handful of sites hosted or thousands of sites hosted. If I can get the media without sending SNI, then I do not send SNI. For anyone on-path who wants to know what sites internet users are visiting, it is none of their business what I have put in the Host header. That is why the Host header is encrypted. It is why TLS1.3 encrypts the certificate. And it is why ESNI/ECH encrypts the SNI as well. Not to mention it is why people _try_ to encrypt DNS. No one needs to know the sites a www user is visiting except the websites themselves. The reader may wonder about certificate verification on the client side. For example, if a "tech" company-sponsored browser detects that the domain name specified in the Host header does not match a domain name specified in a certificate it may refuse to send the HTTP request. For many years, applications using SSL/TLS often failed to do certificate verification correctly or did not do it at all. Today, browsers sponsored by "tech" companies can do certificate verification. However those are not the only programs that can do it. I use a localhost forward proxy to do certificate verification, not a web browser. This is because most HTTP requests I make are (a) noncommercial and (b) done with commandline utilities that do not support graphics and do not do certificate verification (nor SNI). "Noncommercial" here means free, recreational activities, and excludes things like banking, shopping and so forth. For commercial uses, I use a "modern" graphical browser. In some ways, but not others, the phrase "SNI is required" is like the phrase "Javascript is required". I routinely make successful HTTP requests to sites whose web developers claim "Javascript is required". To initiate HTTP requests I use commandline utilities that do not support Javascript. Those requests are not over the wire, they are sent to a loopback address. Only the forward proxy sends HTTP requests and receives responses over the wire. To read HTML or consume other media types, I use a text-only browser or some other program. I have no trouble retrieving media from these sites. Neverthless, there are HN commenters who would still argue "Javascript is required". A phrase can have different meanings to different people.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- 1vuio0pswjnm7 4y agoPerhaps it is helpful to clarify what I mean when I write "SNI is nor required" or "SNI is required". The language I use may not be the same as that used by web developers or people at large commercial CDNs that are trying to influence "upgrades" of traditional internet protocols that were originally developed by people at universities. What I mean by "SNI is not required" is that I can send an HTTP request over TLS without SNI and succesfully retrieve the resource I specified in the HTTP method line and Host header, e.g., I send GET /5/doc/index.html HTTP/1.1 Host: example.com Connection: close and I receive index.html. Whereas if I do not receive index.html unless I also send SNI, then, in the language I use, "SNI is required". In the 173.230.137.156 example I chose, I can still retrieve /5/doc/index.html from api.call-cc.org regardless of whether I send SNI. Yes, the api.call-cc.org domain name does have its own certificate. It does not matter. I can send no SNI, Ican send SNI "example.com" or I can send SNI "3e8.org" and still retrieve /5/doc/index.html in every case (using the certificate for 3e8.org for the public key, etc., the default certificate sent by the httpd at IP address 173.230.137.156). In this example, the operator of the httpd is not checking the SNI against the Host header. The reader may wonder about certificate verification on the client side. For example, if a "tech" company-sponsored browser detects that the domain name specified in the Host header does not match a domain name specified in a certificate it may refuse to send the HTTP request. For many years, applications using SSL/TLS often failed to do certificate verification correctly or did not do it at all. Today, browsers sponsored by "tech" companies can do certificate verification. However they are not the only programs that can do it. I use a localhost forward proxy to do certificate verification not a graphical web browser. This is because most HTTP requests I make are (a) noncommercial and (b) done with commandline utilities that do not support graphics and do not do certificate verification (nor SNI). "Noncommercial" here means things like banking, shopping and so forth. For commercial uses such as those, I use a "modern" graphical browser. In some ways, but not others, the phrase "SNI is required" is like the phrase "Javascript is required". I routinely make successful HTTP requests to sites whose web developers claim "Javascript is required". To initiate HTTP requests I use commandline utilities that do not support Javascript. Those requests are not over the wire, they are sent to a loopback address. Only the forward proxy sends HTTP requests and receives responses over the wire. To read HTML or consume other media types, I use a text-only browser or some other program. I have no trouble retrieving media from these sites. Neverthless, there are HN commenters who would still argue "Javascript is required". A phrase can have different meanings to different people.
- bawolff 4y ago> Despite hosting multiple sites, SNI is not required. Hence I do not send api.call-cc.org in plaintext over the wire. And how do you verify that a man in the middle attack is not in progress if the server is not serving the correct certificate? I appreciate that active attacks are a bit harder than passive listening, but they are still rather trivial. You are proposing making figuring out the domain name slightly harder in exchange for allowing the entire connection to be eavesdropped. This seems like an incredibly bad privacy trade off.
- 1vuio0pswjnm7 4y agoThe person operating api.call-cc.org is the same person who operates 3e8.org. Using the default certificate, with the SAN 3e8.org, is fine. For recreational web use, where I am not using a grahical browser and I am in fact sniffing the traffic myself, the tradeoff is acceptable. The probability of someone on path sniffing every domain name sent in the clear over the wire is high, IMO. It is too easy. I would bet on it. Of the sites that do not require SNI, I am using the default certificate. I am not particularly concerned about the person who controls the default certificate at that IP address being able to see the traffic for all the sites hosted at that address. The large CDNs do require SNI. Generally the ones that do not require SNI are at IP addresses that host only a small number of other sites. The only domain names this person can observe are the ones sent to _that IP address_. The person on path sniffing SNI would can see the domain names sent to _every IP address_. When using the web recreationally, for noncommercial purposes, I cannot see the point of going through the trouble to encrypt the non-confidential contents of web pages and at the same time expending no effort to not send domain names in the clear, and to encrypt SNI where possible. To me, comprehensive recretional browsing history _is_ worth encrypting, perhaps even more than the public web page contents. This is no different than HN users who wish to avoid "smart TVs" that log every program that their owners watch. And for anyone who believes that this evil person controlling the default certificate may be modifying the contents of web pages, then I can easily compare the contents to the same pages retrieved from Internet Archive or Common Crawl.