I think I got the author point and agreeing with those premises I could even share the conclusion. However it seems to me that the argument only works in conclu

I think I got the author point and agreeing with those premises I could even share the conclusion. However it seems to me that the argument only works in concluding something about existing consciousnesses, it doesn't say anything about "a" consciousness (one that doesn't already exist) and even less about a "possible" consciousness. The conclusion is really dependent on which definition of consciousness we adopt, and even more about life: for it is obvious (to me) that being conscious implies being alive. So first we must understand when an hardware capable of computation can become alive. My answer is: when it reproduces itself. Our consciousness hardware is not the brain, it is the world, and life plus consciousness reproduces on the "hardware" called world. So if a computer hardware can support other programs reproducing themselves and by natural selection generate a self-aware program (whichever this definition may be) you can have a conscious program. On one thing I agree: computation itself isn't sufficient to get consciousness.