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> Why do you assume that verbal signals can induce any possible change in symbolic state in a brain? OK let's backup. What would it mean to say that "qualia a

> Why do you assume that verbal signals can induce any possible change in symbolic state in a brain? OK let's backup. What would it mean to say that "qualia are reducible to a symbolic representation" if they cannot be expressed by language ? It seems to me that language includes all possible symbolic representations. Can you give an example of a symbolic representation that is not expressible by language ?

simonh 4y ago
I suspect, just a theory, that qualia are the result of a process that occurs in the brain. So they're not a static symbolic state, they're a feature of the evolution of a dynamic process. We are aware of our own thoughts through processing a mental model of ourselves, this mental model of ourselves includes introspection on our experiences, while we are having those experiences. That's qualia. A static symbolic state would be the equivalent of a memory of experiencing qualia.
- tgflynn 4y ago
  > I suspect, just a theory, that qualia are the result of a process that occurs in the brain. Well, that's just materialism. Do you or do you not accept that it is possible for a materialist to hold the view that qualia are not produced solely by computation but that some non-abstract physical process is required ? Because that is the position that the OP is taking and your original comment appeared to dispute it.
  - simonh 4y ago
    I don’t know what “some non-abstract physical process” means, so I can’t really give you an answer.
    - tgflynn 4y ago
      I said "non-abstract" to prevent a claim along the lines of: computation is sufficient to produce consciousness but it needs to actually run to do it and that invariably requires implementing the computation on some physical system. The point is that computation is abstract, it requires you to pick some physical system but it doesn't care which one, the result is the same regardless. If a non-abstract physical system is required it means that the actual hardware matters. You can't swap it out for another system and expect the same results. For example I could imagine some kind of computer that computes using water and there happens to be a program which when run on that hardware sprays you with water, hence making you wet. But if instead you run that same program compiled for some non-water based architecture then running it won't make you wet.
      - simonh 4y ago
        Ok, so a computer with a water sprinkler attachment. Sorry, I'm not trying to be flippant, the point is any such system would be more than just a CPU, it would need interfaces with the outside world. It could have whatever peripheral systems you like. It could have quantum computational elements, even ones correlating to ones in the brain. I've just no idea what non-computational elements it might have that couldn't be substituted by computational ones or just peripheral components.
        tgflynn 4y ago
        > I've just no idea what non-computational elements it might have that couldn't be substituted by computational ones or just peripheral components. Neither does anyone else but the point is that once you accept that such "non-computational elements" might be or must be required you are no longer talking about computation alone being sufficient to produce consciousness.
        simonh 4y ago
        Agreed, that seems clear, but I see no reason to accept that such elements are necessary, and I have yet to hear any clear explanation of what such elements might actually be. As far as I can tell it would have to be some physical process that affects the behaviour of a computational system, but isn't computational and it's effects on other systems cannot be simulated by computation. Does any such a phenomenon exist in all of physics? Not that I'm aware.
        feet 4y ago
        A wire on its own is not computational, neither is an amino acid but they do make up computational systems. It seems like a bit of an arbitrary distinction
        tgflynn 4y ago
        > As far as I can tell it would have to be some physical process that affects the behaviour of a computational system, but isn't computational and it's effects on other systems cannot be simulated by computation. I mean no physical process is strictly computational. Computations operate on abstract representations of physical things, not on those things themselves. We're back to why weather simulations don't rain on you and why simulations of nuclear explosions don't leave craters in Los Alamos.

simonh 4y ago

I suspect, just a theory, that qualia are the result of a process that occurs in the brain. So they're not a static symbolic state, they're a feature of the evolution of a dynamic process. We are aware of our own thoughts through processing a mental model of ourselves, this mental model of ourselves includes introspection on our experiences, while we are having those experiences. That's qualia. A static symbolic state would be the equivalent of a memory of experiencing qualia.

tgflynn 4y ago
> I suspect, just a theory, that qualia are the result of a process that occurs in the brain. Well, that's just materialism. Do you or do you not accept that it is possible for a materialist to hold the view that qualia are not produced solely by computation but that some non-abstract physical process is required ? Because that is the position that the OP is taking and your original comment appeared to dispute it.
- simonh 4y ago
  I don’t know what “some non-abstract physical process” means, so I can’t really give you an answer.
  - tgflynn 4y ago
    I said "non-abstract" to prevent a claim along the lines of: computation is sufficient to produce consciousness but it needs to actually run to do it and that invariably requires implementing the computation on some physical system. The point is that computation is abstract, it requires you to pick some physical system but it doesn't care which one, the result is the same regardless. If a non-abstract physical system is required it means that the actual hardware matters. You can't swap it out for another system and expect the same results. For example I could imagine some kind of computer that computes using water and there happens to be a program which when run on that hardware sprays you with water, hence making you wet. But if instead you run that same program compiled for some non-water based architecture then running it won't make you wet.
    - simonh 4y ago
      Ok, so a computer with a water sprinkler attachment. Sorry, I'm not trying to be flippant, the point is any such system would be more than just a CPU, it would need interfaces with the outside world. It could have whatever peripheral systems you like. It could have quantum computational elements, even ones correlating to ones in the brain. I've just no idea what non-computational elements it might have that couldn't be substituted by computational ones or just peripheral components.
      - tgflynn 4y ago
        > I've just no idea what non-computational elements it might have that couldn't be substituted by computational ones or just peripheral components. Neither does anyone else but the point is that once you accept that such "non-computational elements" might be or must be required you are no longer talking about computation alone being sufficient to produce consciousness.
        simonh 4y ago
        Agreed, that seems clear, but I see no reason to accept that such elements are necessary, and I have yet to hear any clear explanation of what such elements might actually be. As far as I can tell it would have to be some physical process that affects the behaviour of a computational system, but isn't computational and it's effects on other systems cannot be simulated by computation. Does any such a phenomenon exist in all of physics? Not that I'm aware.
        feet 4y ago
        A wire on its own is not computational, neither is an amino acid but they do make up computational systems. It seems like a bit of an arbitrary distinction
        tgflynn 4y ago
        > As far as I can tell it would have to be some physical process that affects the behaviour of a computational system, but isn't computational and it's effects on other systems cannot be simulated by computation. I mean no physical process is strictly computational. Computations operate on abstract representations of physical things, not on those things themselves. We're back to why weather simulations don't rain on you and why simulations of nuclear explosions don't leave craters in Los Alamos.