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So fundamentally I agree with the arguments presented in this post, but I find the presentation confusing and somewhat lacking in rigor. In particular I was co

So fundamentally I agree with the arguments presented in this post, but I find the presentation confusing and somewhat lacking in rigor. In particular I was confused by his description of the iron bar as a computer because he didn't actually explain how it computed anything. I think that to map a physical system to an abstract Turing Machine you need more than a way to represent bits. You also have to define how to do computations with them. In other words you need something like logic gates. Nonetheless I do think that there is a sense in which computation only has meaning in relation to an external observer, but I think that is an idea that requires some more exploration. It is also a question that I think can be addressed by the methods of Theoretical Computer Science. Beyond that however the strongest argument I can give for why consciousness is not a computation is that (like the post author says) computation is fundamentally about the manipulation of symbols (which means it is closely related to language, whether natural or formal) and qualia (ie. conscious experiences) cannot be represented symbolically (ie. linguistically). To be clear when I say "represented by" I mean "fully represented by" or "reducible to". If qualia were reducible to a symbolic representation then there should be some linguistic utterance which would cause you to experience the sensation of the pain of burning your finger on the stove. Obviously such utterances do not exist. In fact the closest thing in human literature to such an utterance would be a magic spell, which I'm sure you agree, aren't real.

simonh 4y ago
>In particular I was confused by his description of the iron bar as a computer because he didn't actually explain how it computed anything. It's not computing anything. What he's saying is that, by random chance, some pattern of flipping states in the medium might coincidentally correspond to a computer executing a program. Therefore if consciousness is a program, such a pattern could be considered conscious. This is just the Bolzmann's Brain proposition, cf wikipedia. It doesn't prove or refute anything. >If qualia were reducible to a symbolic representation then there should be some linguistic utterance which would cause you to experience the sensation of the pain of burning your finger on the stove. Why do you assume that verbal signals can induce any possible change in symbolic state in a brain? I see no reason to assume or accept that. I can't induce any possible arbitrary change in the internal state of a Switch running MarioKart by mashing on it's control buttons either. There are simply limits to the way it processes it's inputs. Same with humans. If the pain of burning a finger is reducible to symbolic representation by states in a brain, and if we could induce such states artificially such as by using electrodes, then in principle that would produce a sensation indistinguishable from burning your finger. Yes, I believe this is so.
- tgflynn 4y ago
  > Why do you assume that verbal signals can induce any possible change in symbolic state in a brain? OK let's backup. What would it mean to say that "qualia are reducible to a symbolic representation" if they cannot be expressed by language ? It seems to me that language includes all possible symbolic representations. Can you give an example of a symbolic representation that is not expressible by language ?
  - simonh 4y ago
    I suspect, just a theory, that qualia are the result of a process that occurs in the brain. So they're not a static symbolic state, they're a feature of the evolution of a dynamic process. We are aware of our own thoughts through processing a mental model of ourselves, this mental model of ourselves includes introspection on our experiences, while we are having those experiences. That's qualia. A static symbolic state would be the equivalent of a memory of experiencing qualia.
    - tgflynn 4y ago
      > I suspect, just a theory, that qualia are the result of a process that occurs in the brain. Well, that's just materialism. Do you or do you not accept that it is possible for a materialist to hold the view that qualia are not produced solely by computation but that some non-abstract physical process is required ? Because that is the position that the OP is taking and your original comment appeared to dispute it.
      - simonh 4y ago
        I don’t know what “some non-abstract physical process” means, so I can’t really give you an answer.
        tgflynn 4y ago
        I said "non-abstract" to prevent a claim along the lines of: computation is sufficient to produce consciousness but it needs to actually run to do it and that invariably requires implementing the computation on some physical system. The point is that computation is abstract, it requires you to pick some physical system but it doesn't care which one, the result is the same regardless. If a non-abstract physical system is required it means that the actual hardware matters. You can't swap it out for another system and expect the same results. For example I could imagine some kind of computer that computes using water and there happens to be a program which when run on that hardware sprays you with water, hence making you wet. But if instead you run that same program compiled for some non-water based architecture then running it won't make you wet.

simonh 4y ago

>In particular I was confused by his description of the iron bar as a computer because he didn't actually explain how it computed anything. It's not computing anything. What he's saying is that, by random chance, some pattern of flipping states in the medium might coincidentally correspond to a computer executing a program. Therefore if consciousness is a program, such a pattern could be considered conscious. This is just the Bolzmann's Brain proposition, cf wikipedia. It doesn't prove or refute anything. >If qualia were reducible to a symbolic representation then there should be some linguistic utterance which would cause you to experience the sensation of the pain of burning your finger on the stove. Why do you assume that verbal signals can induce any possible change in symbolic state in a brain? I see no reason to assume or accept that. I can't induce any possible arbitrary change in the internal state of a Switch running MarioKart by mashing on it's control buttons either. There are simply limits to the way it processes it's inputs. Same with humans. If the pain of burning a finger is reducible to symbolic representation by states in a brain, and if we could induce such states artificially such as by using electrodes, then in principle that would produce a sensation indistinguishable from burning your finger. Yes, I believe this is so.

tgflynn 4y ago
> Why do you assume that verbal signals can induce any possible change in symbolic state in a brain? OK let's backup. What would it mean to say that "qualia are reducible to a symbolic representation" if they cannot be expressed by language ? It seems to me that language includes all possible symbolic representations. Can you give an example of a symbolic representation that is not expressible by language ?
- simonh 4y ago
  I suspect, just a theory, that qualia are the result of a process that occurs in the brain. So they're not a static symbolic state, they're a feature of the evolution of a dynamic process. We are aware of our own thoughts through processing a mental model of ourselves, this mental model of ourselves includes introspection on our experiences, while we are having those experiences. That's qualia. A static symbolic state would be the equivalent of a memory of experiencing qualia.
  - tgflynn 4y ago
    > I suspect, just a theory, that qualia are the result of a process that occurs in the brain. Well, that's just materialism. Do you or do you not accept that it is possible for a materialist to hold the view that qualia are not produced solely by computation but that some non-abstract physical process is required ? Because that is the position that the OP is taking and your original comment appeared to dispute it.
    - simonh 4y ago
      I don’t know what “some non-abstract physical process” means, so I can’t really give you an answer.
      - tgflynn 4y ago
        I said "non-abstract" to prevent a claim along the lines of: computation is sufficient to produce consciousness but it needs to actually run to do it and that invariably requires implementing the computation on some physical system. The point is that computation is abstract, it requires you to pick some physical system but it doesn't care which one, the result is the same regardless. If a non-abstract physical system is required it means that the actual hardware matters. You can't swap it out for another system and expect the same results. For example I could imagine some kind of computer that computes using water and there happens to be a program which when run on that hardware sprays you with water, hence making you wet. But if instead you run that same program compiled for some non-water based architecture then running it won't make you wet.