3 ms·
He makes any number of unsupported leaps. E.g "consciousness is observer independent". It seems likely, but it's not at all clear it needs to be the case. E.g.
by vidarh 4y ago
He makes any number of unsupported leaps.
E.g "consciousness is observer independent". It seems likely, but it's not at all clear it needs to be the case. E.g. let's say the universe is a simulation for your benefit which optimises away everything that does not directly impact your experience. Maybe my consciousness is just a side effect of currently having an impact on your experience. I have no way of telling whether I blink out of existence the moment I'm not conjured up in order to write this to generate the page you're now reading. It may sound far fetched, but the point is that there is an infinite number of possible observer-dependent universes. As such just ruling it out by default is a gap in his argument.
With respect to his definition of computers, he's glossing over just how little it takes to end up with something which computes. The simplest possible turing machine is ridiculously simple, requiring only 6 rules T(2,3) [1]. While I agree with his argument that such things arising out of nothing by chance is unlikely, it's not at all clear that it's unlikely enough to rule out an infinite number of such devices running mostly "junk" programs that'll crash.
But we also know that it doesn't need to be entirely random - such computation can provide mechanisms for the propagation of life. While cells themselves are not universal turing machines (they have limited "tape"), any number of living things are conceptually universal turing machines (humans being the obvious example), in that they/we can process "tape" without any inherent limitations on length (though practical limitations, certainly).
He then goes on to use his claim that consciousness must be observer independent to claim that even if we have such a computational process, we can't just pick encoding to make a claim of consciousness. But this stretches the claim of observer independence further, and rather than strengthen it, to me it weakens it. Since we don't know what consciousness is, it's not clear that consciousness could not arise from a subjective observation of a process. It's not even clear that this isn't the very core of consciousness. That hypothesis is as supported (in other words: it's not) as the argument he's making. It may be a very weak possibility, but he's not even considered it and given any justification for ruling it out.
I stopped reading there. This is typical of a whole lot of philosophy that makes a whole lot of embedded assumptions that are glossed over because the writer see them as so obvious that they fail to consider that they are assumptions at all. Most of it descends into sophistry without even realising it.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfram%27s_2-state_3-symbol_Turing_machine https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfram%27s_2-state_3-symbol_T...