4 ms·
> The IP address "185.199.108.153" is seen while sniffing the network. Its a github page. I mean you're right, in the case where a domain is using a wildcard c
by bawolff 4y ago
> The IP address "185.199.108.153" is seen while sniffing the network.
Its a github page. I mean you're right, in the case where a domain is using a wildcard cert, and the subdomain is the sensitive part, then esi is the critical leak (assuming the adversary is not sniffing your dns, poisioning your dns, or you are using DoH).
Its a minority case, most sites do not fit into this bucket, but it is a case where you are right.
- 1vuio0pswjnm7 4y ago"Its a github page." The domain name is about.censys.io One cannot get that domain name by looking at the certififcate. The Censys scan for the IP address fails to list it. Passive DNS sources fail to list it. And the name in the reverse DNS (PTR RR) is cdn-185-199-108-153.github.com. echo -e "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: about.censys.io\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n" \ |openssl s_client -connect 185.199.108.153:443 -tls1_3 > 1.htm firefox ./1.htm # or whatever the preferred browser. I use a text-only one I do not use recursive DNS when making HTTP requests for web pages. I fetch DNS data in bulk at selected intervals and store it. The IP address for about.censys.io is loaded into the memory of a localhost forward proxy. The only DNS request before the HTTP request for the about.censys.io page is over the loopback to an authoritative DNS server. It returns the localhost address of the proxy. Web browsing history or at least a list of domains visited is something that not only a "nefarious" person or "adversary" would find useful. The data has commercial value to companies that are actively trying to destroy user privacy. For example, SNI hands ISP's and intermediary "tech" companies this data on a silver platter. People endlessly debated encrypting DNS. Meanwhile the same people are still sending domain names in the clear, thanks to SNI. The companies behind QUIC do not see that as a problem. I do not agree that "Its a minority case". For example, if we take all the sites submitted to HN as an example, the sites using CDNs will of course present an ambiguity problem on the scale of the Github case and the ones not using CDNs, IME, do not normally work without hostnames nor do they consistently reveal the correct hostname in the certificate. The certificate will often list several names. As such, I cannot take a list of IP addresses for all those sites and quickly, reliably transform them into the domains submitted to HN. The convenience of SNI for conducting surveillance of domain names visited is not paralleled by trying to convert IP addresses to domain names.
- bawolff 4y ago> The domain name is about.censys.io Which appears to be implemented as a github page unless i am mistaken. > One cannot get that domain name by looking at the certififcate. Really, because this is the certificate i get when i view that domain (with correct SNI): https://crt.sh/?id=6682474444 https://crt.sh/?id=6682474444 Its right there in the common name field. Unless you mean that its not in the default cert for that IP, which sure, but in the scenario where we are evesdropping on SNI, if we couldnt do that, why not just evesdrop on the certificate itself. It should be just as easy. I'm not sure what your point is here. If this was a foo.github.io page and github had a wildcard cert on *.github.io it would support your position. But about.censys.io is not doing that. This is an example where you need SNI to choose the correct certificate as its being hosted on a cdn hosting many different sites. > I fetch DNS data in bulk at selected intervals and store it That's cool and all, but that's not how normal people use dns, nor is it likely that that will become common, so its useless when talking about internet privacy. If doing something totally abnormal is a valid solution, we might as well just say everyone should use tor. > Web browsing history or at least a list of domains visited is something that not only a "nefarious" person or "adversary" would find useful. The data has commercial value to companies that are actively trying to destroy user privacy When people say nefarious, that is one of the groups they mean. Heck, this is almost a dictionary definition of nefarious. > The certificate will often list several names. It is very rare for the subject-alt-name to be for unrelated sites, all hosted on the same ip, and not require an SNI to select the correct certificate. So rare, that i challenge you to actually find a real example.
- 1vuio0pswjnm7 4y agoIf bawolff knew the domain name, why did he not give that as the answer to the hypothetical. Strange. Looking up the certificate for about.censys.io on crt.sh is not the same as looking up the certificate for 185.199.108.153. Try it. https://crt.sh/?q=185.199.108.153 https://crt.sh/?q=185.199.108.153 If starting with only an IP address, 185.199.108.153, what does the certificate reveal. echo|openssl s_client -connect 185.199.108.153:443 -showcerts|openssl x509 -text Does it indicate the domain name the user intended to visit, about.censys.io, as would SNI. SNI reveals more than "Its a github page" or a list of sites that are "related", i.e., hosted on the same IP address.^1 SNI provides the network observer with the exact domain name that a user intended to visit. Aside from faking SNI, domain fronting, or similar tactics, the results are reliable. IP addresses do not indicate the exact domain name that a user intended to visit. Methods used to try to guess the domain name are unreliable. A list of remote IP addresses observed on the wire is not the same as a list of domain names observed on the wire as servernames (SNI). The former requires more work than the later and produces ambiguous, unreliable results. 1. A network observer could look for Subject Alternative Names in certificates passing over the wire in cleartext and try to guess which domain name the user intended to visit. However this will not work for TLS1.3 because the certificates will be encrypted.