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Hypothetical The IP address "185.199.108.153" is seen while sniffing the network. What is the domain name. This site does not require SNI. Visiting the addr
by 1vuio0pswjnm7 4y ago
Hypothetical
The IP address "185.199.108.153" is seen while sniffing the network.
What is the domain name.
This site does not require SNI. Visiting the address and/or examining the certificate will not reveal the domain name.
Consider that sniffing the SNI from a TLS packet requires no guesswork and no additonal lookups. It is designed to be high throughput and used in making routing decisions. The question is not whether solving this hypothetical is possible. Of course the answer is, "Yes, it is". Rather, the question is whether solving it requires no more work than sniffing the SNI from a TLS packet. To use bawolff's words, "... people can just look at IP, so it does not really matter."
Also, remember, the comment I made is about privacy from "tech" companies, resistance to surveillance capitalism by American companies, not censorship in China.
- zinekeller 4y agoSince that we're talking practicals, let's look at China's answer: just block the IP, we already knew what's behind it anyways. Besides, in an SNI-less world the censors would just visit the IP address - that's not significantly different on today's checking of SNI. Besides, some email filtering now also checks the IP address' associated domains, which not just includes the rDNS (that's easy) but also using a DNS datafeed that shows which domains point to that IP.
- bawolff 4y agoIn fairness - counterexample: at various times china has blocked zh.wikipedia.org, but doesnt want to block en.wikipedia.org as that makes them look draconian to visiting foreigners. Both sites are on the same IP with same wildcard cert. Their options are basically only SNI sniffing or DNS poisioning.
- zinekeller 4y ago> In fairness - counterexample: at various times china has blocked zh.wikipedia.org, but doesnt want to block en.wikipedia.org as that makes them look draconian to visiting foreigners. While I'll accept this as a hypothetical, I've just verified this one since I remember Wikimedia has a rather complicated structure (https://wikitech.wikimedia.org/wiki/Data_centers https://wikitech.wikimedia.org/wiki/Data_centers), and I can verify that in the US you'll see an Let's Encrypt-issued wildcard certificates, while the Singaporean datacenter sends Digicert certificates that is apparently separated (except for desktop and mobile one - so for example accessing en.wikipedia sends you en.wikipedia and en.m.wikipedia), and the European ones (if my understanting is the current setup) uses Globalsign-issued certs, so probably they're dealing with censorship in a methodical matter.
- bawolff 4y agoYou still get a wildcard cert. e.g. if i do: echo -e 'GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: en.wikipedia.org\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n' | openssl s_client -connect text-lb.eqsin.wikimedia.org:443 -ign_eof -noservername -showcerts I get a cert with: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: DNS:\*.wikipedia.org, DNS:wikimedia.org, DNS:mediawiki.org, DNS:wikibooks.org, DNS:wikidata.org, DNS:wikinews.org, DNS:wikiquote.org, DNS:wikisource.org, DNS:wikiversity.org, DNS:wikivoyage.org, DNS:wiktionary.org, DNS:wikimediafoundation.org, DNS:w.wiki, DNS:wmfusercontent.org, DNS:\*.m.wikipedia.org, DNS:\*.wikimedia.org, DNS:\*.m.wikimedia.org, DNS:\*.planet.wikimedia.org, DNS:\*.mediawiki.org, DNS:\*.m.mediawiki.org, DNS:\*.wikibooks.org, DNS:\*.m.wikibooks.org, DNS:\*.wikidata.org, DNS:\*.m.wikidata.org, DNS:\*.wikinews.org, DNS:\*.m.wikinews.org, DNS:\*.wikiquote.org, DNS:\*.m.wikiquote.org, DNS:\*.wikisource.org, DNS:\*.m.wikisource.org, DNS:\*.wikiversity.org, DNS:\*.m.wikiversity.org, DNS:\*.wikivoyage.org, DNS:\*.m.wikivoyage.org, DNS:\*.wiktionary.org, DNS:\*.m.wiktionary.org, DNS:\*.wikimediafoundation.org, DNS:\*.wmfusercontent.org, DNS:wikipedia.org I suspect the different certs are just to have a backup cert that is always being tested that can quickly be swapped to if something goes wrong.
- bawolff 4y ago> The IP address "185.199.108.153" is seen while sniffing the network. Its a github page. I mean you're right, in the case where a domain is using a wildcard cert, and the subdomain is the sensitive part, then esi is the critical leak (assuming the adversary is not sniffing your dns, poisioning your dns, or you are using DoH). Its a minority case, most sites do not fit into this bucket, but it is a case where you are right.
- 1vuio0pswjnm7 4y ago"Its a github page." The domain name is about.censys.io One cannot get that domain name by looking at the certififcate. The Censys scan for the IP address fails to list it. Passive DNS sources fail to list it. And the name in the reverse DNS (PTR RR) is cdn-185-199-108-153.github.com. echo -e "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: about.censys.io\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n" \ |openssl s_client -connect 185.199.108.153:443 -tls1_3 > 1.htm firefox ./1.htm # or whatever the preferred browser. I use a text-only one I do not use recursive DNS when making HTTP requests for web pages. I fetch DNS data in bulk at selected intervals and store it. The IP address for about.censys.io is loaded into the memory of a localhost forward proxy. The only DNS request before the HTTP request for the about.censys.io page is over the loopback to an authoritative DNS server. It returns the localhost address of the proxy. Web browsing history or at least a list of domains visited is something that not only a "nefarious" person or "adversary" would find useful. The data has commercial value to companies that are actively trying to destroy user privacy. For example, SNI hands ISP's and intermediary "tech" companies this data on a silver platter. People endlessly debated encrypting DNS. Meanwhile the same people are still sending domain names in the clear, thanks to SNI. The companies behind QUIC do not see that as a problem. I do not agree that "Its a minority case". For example, if we take all the sites submitted to HN as an example, the sites using CDNs will of course present an ambiguity problem on the scale of the Github case and the ones not using CDNs, IME, do not normally work without hostnames nor do they consistently reveal the correct hostname in the certificate. The certificate will often list several names. As such, I cannot take a list of IP addresses for all those sites and quickly, reliably transform them into the domains submitted to HN. The convenience of SNI for conducting surveillance of domain names visited is not paralleled by trying to convert IP addresses to domain names.