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"So, while it is technically still possible to censor HTTP/3 connections based on the SNI in TLS, the collected data shows that hardly any censors actually pars
by 1vuio0pswjnm7 4y ago
"So, while it is technically still possible to censor HTTP/3 connections based on the SNI in TLS, the collected data shows that hardly any censors actually parse and use this information (even when they do parse the SNI in traditional HTTPS traffic)."
What about the privacy issues raised by SNI.^1 Why have the "tech" company sponsors of QUIC failed to address this problem. Instead they actually wanted to _require_ SNI.^2 There is zero attention to user privacy in the development of QUIC. The protocol increases surveillance and reconnassiance capabilities of the "tech" company sponsored web browser, and user privacy against "tech" companies is completely ignored. Unlike QUIC, at least the TLS project is working on a solution to the SNI problem. Cloudflare offers one of the early solution protoypes, ESNI. I have been using it for several years now with no problems.
In CurveCP, a predecessor of QUIC (and possibly the inspiration for QUIC), SNI is not required. Multiple sites can be securely hosted on the same address.^3 Both TLS1.3 and thereby QUIC use encryption developed by the author of CurveCP. The thinking of the companies behind QUIC regarding available technology seems to be "If it benefits "tech" company strategy then use it. If it only benefits users but not "tech" companies, then ignore it."
1. TLS worked before SNI was introduced, and the web worked before AWS and their ilk existed. There are still many, many, many websites that use TLS but no not require SNI. If one only sees the web as a handful of CDNs, then it is easy to ignore these other TLS sites. However they exist, regardless of whether CDN devotees choose to acknowledge them. And no, trying to perform reverse DNS lookups on IP addresses in real-time is no substitute for grabbing cleartext domain names from SNI. It requires more effort and does not work consistently.
2.
https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/issues/794 https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/issues/794 (intersting coicidence: group member arguing for SNI mandate works for a CDN)
3.
https://curvecp.org/addressing.html https://curvecp.org/addressing.html
- sofixa 4y ago> Before a client can create a CurveCP connection, it needs to know (1) the server's long-term public key and (2) the server's address That (1) seems wildly impractical? How would you distribute, securely, privately, anonymously and generally ( for the whole planet) the public keys? The only way i can think of is something like the HSTS preload lists which is quite centralised ( per browser), or DNS. Also it's IPv4 only, which is only kind of excusable for "last version 2011". I don't see a way around either SNI-like mechanism or a pre-shared key for hosting multiple sites on the same IP, unless everyone moves to IPv6 (which would still be annoying for web hosting, to have an IP per domain). Edit: > The client and server administrators don't meet secretly to share an encryption/authentication key. The server has a long-term public key S visible to everyone; the client uses this key S to encrypt data for the server and to verify data from the server So the wording is a bit unclear, the client needs to know the key, but the key is visible to everyone.
- vbezhenar 4y ago> or DNS That’s correct. ECH relies on DNS over HTTPS to retrieve server public key which is used to encrypt client hello message.
- sofixa 4y agoSo the censor just needs to inspect the DNS over HTTPS' request's SNI and block that? Even easier for them, the blocklist is shorter.
- vbezhenar 4y agoWell, if you're using something like 1.1.1.1 for your DoH, you don't really need to inspect SNI, I don't think that there're other domains on that IP address. Yes, blocking stuff is the ultimate way and you can't really deal with that. You can just block any ECH (former ESNI) traffic as well. Encrypting domain is a way to prevent someone learning things about your traffic. It's not a way to stop blocking. I'd say it's a way to provoke more blocking. It might sound strange, but to reduce blocking you should remove encryption altogether. Usually censors apply censorship on a specific web pages. So if you're browsing wikipedia without encryption, censors can block that specific article, but rest will be available to you. With encryption the entire wikipedia should be blocked just to restrict access to a single article. BTW you can remove encryption but keep authentication. TLS (at least previous versions) allowed for that. Theoretically it'd allow censors to apply their censorships, but it'd prevent them from changing content. I think that in the future people will think more about that concept.
- dane-pgp 4y agoSo you suggest that we give up all privacy (including the privacy of all our online passwords), and lose access to every page that a government censor might take issue to, just to prevent the hypothetical problem of the government over-blocking pages that it doesn't strictly need to? Actually I think that over-blocking would be good, as it would encourage more people to use Tor and VPNs, it would encourage more negative public opinion against the government spies/censors, and it would act as a form of economic sanctions against the regime because their citizens would get less value from the internet than they would without the over-blocking.
- bawolff 4y ago> TLS worked before SNI was introduced, and the web worked before AWS and their ilk existed. There are still many, many, many websites that use TLS but no not require SNI. If one only sees the web as a handful of CDNs, then it is easy to ignore these other TLS sites. However they exist, regardless of whether CDN devotees choose to acknowledge them. CDNs are not the only use case for virtual hosts on the web. Admittidly, subject-alt-name does help with that compared to the pre-sni web. In any case, if SNI is not needed, than the ip address is neccesarily unique, in which case no privacy is lost by having the sni as nefarious people can just look at IP, so it doesnt really matter.
- pabs3 4y agoEven with CDNs and ESNI, discovering the site is possible using various techniques: https://blog.apnic.net/2019/08/23/what-can-you-learn-from-an-ip-address/ https://blog.apnic.net/2019/08/23/what-can-you-learn-from-an... https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28103770 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28103770
- 1vuio0pswjnm7 4y ago"We also accounted for several resources that get loaded from different web servers due to the sub-queries performed when a website is requested. The set of all these IPs contacted is referred to as the Page Load Fingerprint (PLF) of the website." This method is restricted to clients that automatically load resources and/or run Javascript, e.g., so-called "modern" browsers. It will not work with non-browser clients. For example, I make HTTP requests using TCP clients and HTTP generators. There is no automatic loading of resources nor Javascript support. Another example is CCBot, the Common Crawl's Nutch crawler. It does not request CSS, images, Javascript, etc. Some researchers claim that sites can be fingerprinted by HTTP response size. People claim this is mitigated by HTTP/2 multiplexing and pipelining.^1 Because I use TCP clients not a browser to make HTTP requests, I can use HTTP/1.1 pipelining. Thus HTTP response size is not reliably predictive of any specific site. I can easily vary the size using pipelining. 1. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.00641 https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.00641
- pabs3 4y ago
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- turminal 4y agoI wish improvements to the protocols we use were less bigcorp centric and did more to address privacy issues.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]