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We don't know of anything that is provably not computation. There's not a single proof that "process X is not reproducible computationally, yet it is implemente

We don't know of anything that is provably not computation. There's not a single proof that "process X is not reproducible computationally, yet it is implemented in the universe". All the statements like the one in the subject line are desires (conscious or unconscious) for special privilege for humans.

Ologn 4y ago
> We don't know of anything that is provably not computation. How about the halting problem? :)
- joenathanone 4y ago
  Or dividing by zero
- l33t2328 4y ago
  If you show me a TM with an infinite length memory tape I’ll accept that.
- mr_toad 4y ago
  Is there a physical system that solves the halting problem?
- __MatrixMan__ 4y ago
  Presumably you mean the halting problem for Turing Machines? It's undecidable for other Turing machines, but that doesn't mean it's undecidable for all machines.
- 0xBABAD00C 4y ago
  > "yet it is implemented in the universe"
- nl 4y ago
  The existence of uncomputable problems does not mean the things we know are not from computation.
- epgui 4y ago
  I would submit that a computation that never completes is probably still a computation.
ttctciyf 4y ago
Proving a negative is not always possible, but the irreducible randomness in quantum measurement or "wave function collapse" is essentially defined as uncomputable. You can of course simulate quantum randomness using an RNG or some such but the essential inherent unpredictability can't be simulated like that. To be clear, I'm not trying to argue that quantum randomness is a component of consciousness! Regards consciousness and computation, though, it's always seemed suspicious to me that we can't reliably specify 'qualia' like "what it's like to feel wet" or "what it's like to hear a trumpet" except either in terms of a physical description (e.g. the waveform of the trumpet note) that misses out the experiential component or in terms of "samples" - i.e. references to other 'qualia': "sounds like a french horn but less round" or whatever. I'd have thought being able to adequately specify something was a necessary step in reducing it to computation. We've been using language for thousands of years though, and as far as I'm aware precisely specifying experiences in this way is still an unsolved problem.
- epgui 4y ago
  >"wave function collapse" is essentially defined as uncomputable. Maybe uncomputable using a macbook pro or classical computer, yes (I accept this for the sake of argument)... But that doesn't make it "not a computation" fundamentally. In other words, it's not super clear and obvious that quantum mechanics is not fundamentally computational. We are trying to build quantum computers which take advantage of some interesting quantum effects, after all. I suspect that if/when we get those quantum computers to do useful things, we will still describe what they are doing as "performing computations", even if Bell's theorem rules out hidden variables with the locality assumption. > inherent unpredictability Note also that the presence of randomness does not necessarily preclude something from being computational in nature.
  - ttctciyf 4y ago
    > the presence of randomness does not necessarily preclude something from being computational in nature In the case of single events, it does preclude something from being computational in nature, if you take unpredictability as the hallmark of randomness. Predictability and repeatability are built in to computation and built out of randomness, as it were. In one stringent definition of randomness (that of algorithmic information theory) it is literally defined by reference to its uncomputability.

Ologn 4y ago

> We don't know of anything that is provably not computation. How about the halting problem? :)

joenathanone 4y ago
Or dividing by zero
l33t2328 4y ago
If you show me a TM with an infinite length memory tape I’ll accept that.
mr_toad 4y ago
Is there a physical system that solves the halting problem?
__MatrixMan__ 4y ago
Presumably you mean the halting problem for Turing Machines? It's undecidable for other Turing machines, but that doesn't mean it's undecidable for all machines.
0xBABAD00C 4y ago
> "yet it is implemented in the universe"
nl 4y ago
The existence of uncomputable problems does not mean the things we know are not from computation.
epgui 4y ago
I would submit that a computation that never completes is probably still a computation.

ttctciyf 4y ago

Proving a negative is not always possible, but the irreducible randomness in quantum measurement or "wave function collapse" is essentially defined as uncomputable. You can of course simulate quantum randomness using an RNG or some such but the essential inherent unpredictability can't be simulated like that. To be clear, I'm not trying to argue that quantum randomness is a component of consciousness! Regards consciousness and computation, though, it's always seemed suspicious to me that we can't reliably specify 'qualia' like "what it's like to feel wet" or "what it's like to hear a trumpet" except either in terms of a physical description (e.g. the waveform of the trumpet note) that misses out the experiential component or in terms of "samples" - i.e. references to other 'qualia': "sounds like a french horn but less round" or whatever. I'd have thought being able to adequately specify something was a necessary step in reducing it to computation. We've been using language for thousands of years though, and as far as I'm aware precisely specifying experiences in this way is still an unsolved problem.

epgui 4y ago
>"wave function collapse" is essentially defined as uncomputable. Maybe uncomputable using a macbook pro or classical computer, yes (I accept this for the sake of argument)... But that doesn't make it "not a computation" fundamentally. In other words, it's not super clear and obvious that quantum mechanics is not fundamentally computational. We are trying to build quantum computers which take advantage of some interesting quantum effects, after all. I suspect that if/when we get those quantum computers to do useful things, we will still describe what they are doing as "performing computations", even if Bell's theorem rules out hidden variables with the locality assumption. > inherent unpredictability Note also that the presence of randomness does not necessarily preclude something from being computational in nature.
- ttctciyf 4y ago
  > the presence of randomness does not necessarily preclude something from being computational in nature In the case of single events, it does preclude something from being computational in nature, if you take unpredictability as the hallmark of randomness. Predictability and repeatability are built in to computation and built out of randomness, as it were. In one stringent definition of randomness (that of algorithmic information theory) it is literally defined by reference to its uncomputability.