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> Before getting too deep we need a working definition of consciousness. This is a tricky concept to define rigorously since it seems that a rigorous definition
by civilized 4y ago
> Before getting too deep we need a working definition of consciousness. This is a tricky concept to define rigorously since it seems that a rigorous definition of consciousness practically requires a theory of consciousness itself. To make matters worse, in these kinds of discussions it oftentimes gets mingled with related ideas like self-awareness, intelligence, and executive function. But in this post I am interested only in consciousness as a sort of perception or sentience — an awareness of being, or, more loosely, “what it feels like to be something.”
I'm not sure this definition succeeds in distinguishing consciousness from some mixture of perception and self-awareness, both of which machines running programs can have.
Maybe defining consciousness is difficult because we don't really understand what we mean by it, and our attempts to make claims about it are more flimsy and baseless than we like to believe.
The "what it is like to be a bat" stuff doesn't illuminate the matter at all. It just elevates the figure of speech "what it is like" to an illusion of philosophical rigor.
- burrows 4y agoI think the real problem is pretending that the phrase “what it feels like to be something” is going to act like a key in my dict of feelings. A: You know, the feeling of what it is like to be something. B: sits quietly, looks at ceiling Right, yeah, that feeling. From a different angle, if OP wants to define “consciousness” as some feeling it sounds like he’s basically done. He’s labeled one of his feelings with the word “consciousness”. I’m not sure what point of contention remains.
- civilized 4y agoHow would we know what it is "like" to be something? It's like asking the fish what is water. We've never not experienced it. There is nothing to compare it to.
- burrows 4y agoI don’t understand “asking a fish a question”. But maybe the question you are proposing is the following, “Is it possible to identify a sensation that is always present?”. Maybe this question is coherent? I’m not sure. Suppose it isn’t possible to identify a sensation that is always present. Then wouldn’t that mean the state of having no sensations is identical to the state of only having sensations that are always present?
- manx 4y agoSimilarly, we also have a hard time defining intelligence. I often ask people how they would define intelligence, and I get wildly different answers. The common understanding of these words is very fuzzy.