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A Quick Look at QUIC Censorship
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- 1vuio0pswjnm7 4y ago"So, while it is technically still possible to censor HTTP/3 connections based on the SNI in TLS, the collected data shows that hardly any censors actually parse and use this information (even when they do parse the SNI in traditional HTTPS traffic)." What about the privacy issues raised by SNI.^1 Why have the "tech" company sponsors of QUIC failed to address this problem. Instead they actually wanted to _require_ SNI.^2 There is zero attention to user privacy in the development of QUIC. The protocol increases surveillance and reconnassiance capabilities of the "tech" company sponsored web browser, and user privacy against "tech" companies is completely ignored. Unlike QUIC, at least the TLS project is working on a solution to the SNI problem. Cloudflare offers one of the early solution protoypes, ESNI. I have been using it for several years now with no problems. In CurveCP, a predecessor of QUIC (and possibly the inspiration for QUIC), SNI is not required. Multiple sites can be securely hosted on the same address.^3 Both TLS1.3 and thereby QUIC use encryption developed by the author of CurveCP. The thinking of the companies behind QUIC regarding available technology seems to be "If it benefits "tech" company strategy then use it. If it only benefits users but not "tech" companies, then ignore it." 1. TLS worked before SNI was introduced, and the web worked before AWS and their ilk existed. There are still many, many, many websites that use TLS but no not require SNI. If one only sees the web as a handful of CDNs, then it is easy to ignore these other TLS sites. However they exist, regardless of whether CDN devotees choose to acknowledge them. And no, trying to perform reverse DNS lookups on IP addresses in real-time is no substitute for grabbing cleartext domain names from SNI. It requires more effort and does not work consistently. 2. https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/issues/794 https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/issues/794 (intersting coicidence: group member arguing for SNI mandate works for a CDN) 3. https://curvecp.org/addressing.html https://curvecp.org/addressing.html
- sofixa 4y ago> Before a client can create a CurveCP connection, it needs to know (1) the server's long-term public key and (2) the server's address That (1) seems wildly impractical? How would you distribute, securely, privately, anonymously and generally ( for the whole planet) the public keys? The only way i can think of is something like the HSTS preload lists which is quite centralised ( per browser), or DNS. Also it's IPv4 only, which is only kind of excusable for "last version 2011". I don't see a way around either SNI-like mechanism or a pre-shared key for hosting multiple sites on the same IP, unless everyone moves to IPv6 (which would still be annoying for web hosting, to have an IP per domain). Edit: > The client and server administrators don't meet secretly to share an encryption/authentication key. The server has a long-term public key S visible to everyone; the client uses this key S to encrypt data for the server and to verify data from the server So the wording is a bit unclear, the client needs to know the key, but the key is visible to everyone.
- vbezhenar 4y ago> or DNS That’s correct. ECH relies on DNS over HTTPS to retrieve server public key which is used to encrypt client hello message.
- sofixa 4y agoSo the censor just needs to inspect the DNS over HTTPS' request's SNI and block that? Even easier for them, the blocklist is shorter.
- vbezhenar 4y agoWell, if you're using something like 1.1.1.1 for your DoH, you don't really need to inspect SNI, I don't think that there're other domains on that IP address. Yes, blocking stuff is the ultimate way and you can't really deal with that. You can just block any ECH (former ESNI) traffic as well. Encrypting domain is a way to prevent someone learning things about your traffic. It's not a way to stop blocking. I'd say it's a way to provoke more blocking. It might sound strange, but to reduce blocking you should remove encryption altogether. Usually censors apply censorship on a specific web pages. So if you're browsing wikipedia without encryption, censors can block that specific article, but rest will be available to you. With encryption the entire wikipedia should be blocked just to restrict access to a single article. BTW you can remove encryption but keep authentication. TLS (at least previous versions) allowed for that. Theoretically it'd allow censors to apply their censorships, but it'd prevent them from changing content. I think that in the future people will think more about that concept.
- nindalf 4y agoSeems like both HTTPS and HTTP/3 can be censored by looking at the Server Name Indication (SNI)? The report says that’s exactly what Russia is doing today. Then I’m confused by this statement > So, while it is technically still possible to censor HTTP/3 connections based on the SNI in TLS, the collected data shows that hardly any censors actually parse and use this information (even when they do parse the SNI in traditional HTTPS traffic). Most of these countries would use censorship software developed elsewhere. Once this software becomes capable of reading the SNI in HTTP/3 traffic, seems like we would return to the status quo?
- vbezhenar 4y agoAFAIK Russia censorship just drops HTTP 3 connections forcing browsers to downgrade.
- tialaramex 4y ago> Most of these countries would use censorship software developed elsewhere. Once this software becomes capable of reading the SNI in HTTP/3 traffic, seems like we would return to the status quo? Yes. Outside of China countries tend to purchase off-the-shelf middleboxes similar to those a typical US corporation or school might use for this purpose. Actual functionality is not hugely important for these products, the sales person's job is to persuade somebody who controls the purchase decision to give them money, and the actual product capabilities are moot. The problem for such products isn't reading SNI out of an HTTP/3 stream but successfully switching off matching streams. For TLS all they did is shut down the TCP connection on a match. But there is no connection for HTTP/3 because QUIC is a connectionless protocol. So you just get a bunch of UDP packets and now it's your job to figure out which ones to drop as part of your "legitimate network security product". So you can expect "There's an off switch for HTTP/3" plus existing per-network customisations to be the extent of their work for the foreseeable future. If the customer mentions HTTP/3 point them at the switch. Remember that (unlike China) these programmes aren't really focused on practical censorship, because the real goal was achieved once the purchase order paperwork was signed.
- ignoramous 4y ago
- hexmiles 4y agoIt is required to send a sni in clear at every connection? In theory, after the first connection, you should be able to just fully encrypt the entire packet by using the certificate (public key) of the website. If that is the case, is it possible to "preload" a list of keys into the useragent to avoid having to pass the SNI in clear? I understand that is not always practical, but can it help against censorship?
- tialaramex 4y ago> you should be able to just fully encrypt the entire packet by using the certificate (public key) of the website The public key is not used (unless you are doing RSA key exchange which is terrible and you should stop, this is no longer possible in TLS 1.3) to encrypt anything. Modern schemes, including TLS 1.3 and thus HTTP/3 do ECDH key agreement and then the public key is used for signatures to authenticate your peer.
- superkuh 4y agoCensorship resistance? It's the exact opposite despite the efforts. When you include CA based TLS in the protocol and there's no option for clear text, combined with no human person in existence running a recognized CA, what you get is complete non-human control of the entire web. It becomes no longer possible to host a visitable website without getting (temporary) approval from some CA. And guess what? If that CA isn't already a government entity, it sure can be influenced by them and other outside forces. Protocol baked in CA TLS is very dangerous for human persons despite how great it is for corporate persons.
- jhugo 4y agoCA based TLS isn't included in the protocol. The UA is free to decide how to trust certificates. If you can come up with a better model than the CA model, QUIC supports your model without changes.
- hulitu 4y agoIt is for your own good. Think about the children. You are empowered. Safe, private and secure. We value your privacy. /s
- jpambrun 4y agoMy work still block http2 so their inspection proxy can do its thing, I doubt I will ever see http3..