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There are mechanisms out there that try to minimise data exfiltration to validate certain facts about a person. IRMA [1] has a system that's developed quite wel
by jeroenhd 4y ago
There are mechanisms out there that try to minimise data exfiltration to validate certain facts about a person. IRMA [1] has a system that's developed quite well though development and expansion has slowed down over the years. It's a lot more chatty than using offline certificates, but the privacy challenges are very similar. The basic premise is that your ID holds your date of birth and that date of birth can be used to generate a signed token that says "over x years old". For Europe this can be 18, for America this can be 16 or 21, depending on what you're trying to gatekeep.
Having users manage cryptographic secrets seems like an absolutely terrible idea. Developers and system administrators are incapable of renewing certificates in time, it'll only slow everything down.
None of these technical measures solve the core issue, though, which is that kids will lie about their age online. They'll find a friend/family member/random guy over the required age and copy the super privacy friendly secret token to their devices and boom, everyone is 18. Cryptographic age requirements raise the bar but ultimately they'll never be enough.
[1] https://irma.app/?lang=en https://irma.app/?lang=en
- EGreg 4y agoWhat I am talking about is essential for voting or UBI. One person one account. It isn’t just for kids. The hardest part is to make sure that the certificate issuing authorities aren’t corrupted (eg by having a self regulating organization like FINRA) when they give out certificates — since those represent free cashflows or outsize voting shares.