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Surely this could (should?) work something like this? Person buys a new PC from a major OEM , this PC has secure boot enabled and the only key installed is the
by jiggy2011 15y ago
Surely this could (should?) work something like this?
Person buys a new PC from a major OEM , this PC has secure boot enabled and the only key installed is the one which matches the OS that comes with the PC. For users who never want to install another OS this is fine and will never be changed.
In bios settings there is an option to download additional keys, this connects to the OEM (or global CA) website via SSL using the NIC that shipped with the PC. The SSL cert is used to authenticate that the CA is genuine.
The master CA then sends a list of other sub-CAs (e.g Microsoft , Ubuntu , RedHat, Haiku etc etc). The user can select which ones they want to allow.
When the Computer tries to boot something with a key that it doesn't recognise it will first try and SSL connect to the CAs that have been selected and find a matching key. These could also contain blacklists of known malware keys and warn the user. If the key is found it is then installed as a known good key and allowed to boot.
There could also be an 'advanced' section in the BIOS which could allow the user to either disable secure boot or manually add a key.
So if somebody was to recompile their kernel or bootloader (or just install a very obscure OS) (not sure which is required to be verified) they would simply have to write down the key (generated at compile time) on a piece of paper and input it. This would be a minor pain but would still allow for the option.
This would probably kill hackintoshes though as I doubt Apple would sign their OS for general PC usage, although manually adding the key may get around this.
My knowledge on trusted computing / crypto technology is a bit limited, any reason why this would not work / be a bad idea?
- nodata 15y agoIf users knew what a CA was and how to determine whether or not a CA was trustworthy, there wouldn't be a need for "secure" boot.
- jiggy2011 15y agoThe user wouldn't need to know what a CA was unless they were planning on installing an additional/different OS. The default option would only allow the one that was installed by default. So unless they went poking around in bios they wouldn't even be aware of it unless some malware hijacked their bootloader in which case they would get a warning at bootup and have their last known good bootloader restored automatically. Since all the sub-CAs would be verified either by the OEM or by a global authority of somekind users could assume that all the options they were presented with were trustworthy.
- dpark 15y agoThis seems like a whole lot of engineering to make that scheme work. You're saying that the BIOS should ship with a full TCP/IP stack and an SSL implementation. On top of that, you've got no way of updating the root SSL certs (or the SSL itself, in the event of a flaw being discovered) short of a firmware reflash. And you're requiring that the entire system depends on the root CA.
- jiggy2011 15y agoThere would be a fair bit of engineering but I imagine doing secure boot at all would require a fair bit. Would it be difficult to include a TCP/IP stack? You could probably just use the one from BSD or something. The root CA would be mainly used to authenticate other CAs , so in this case it wouldn't be much different to how SSL works anyway. You could presumably just load parts of the software as well as the keys in volitile battery backed memory the same was as bios settings?