3 ms·

>, but against a modern armed force they wouldn't stand a chance. They seem to be doing quite well against the modern army of Ukraine, NATO-trained for 7-8 yea

>, but against a modern armed force they wouldn't stand a chance. They seem to be doing quite well against the modern army of Ukraine, NATO-trained for 7-8 years now.

yks 4y ago
The line of engagement barely moved in 3 months all the while Ukraine is hopelessly outgunned, Russians are doing quite well indeed /s. In reality UAF wasn't even a really modern army, just more modern than Russia, and all their "NATO" training in effect started in 2014. Where do people get the impression that Russian army is strong and capable is beyond me, they just throw people into the meat grinder and sit on top of the infinite Soviet arsenal of old equipment.
- thrwy_meta 4y ago
  A properly-sized invasion force given the physical size of Ukraine, and the size of its army, should have been 400,000-600,000 strong. Russia went in with <200,000, with its force structure badly allocated (not enough infantrymen or logistics guys), and has still managed to occupy a land area larger than Portugal + Ireland combined. And they've done that with essentially their peacetime standing forces. From the perspective of how the Russian army is "supposed" to fight (with a massive mobilization to flesh out its units), this invasion is essentially with one hand tied behind its back by improper force design/employment, and the other tied by rampant corruption. Still, Russia is beating Ukraine to death with headbutts...and also suffering a TBI in the process. "Quantity has a quality all its own". They aren't considered "strong" because individual Russian battalions are expert warfighters per se. They're considered "strong" because the Russian military-industrial complex in its totality is not something that can be idly ignored by anyone except maybe the US or China. Basically Russia scores high on 3 particular Principles of War: Mass, Offensive, and Simplicity. Not so well on the other 6 though. https://www.trngcmd.marines.mil/Portals/207/Docs/TBS/B2B2269%20Tactical%20Fundamentals.pdf?ver=2015-06-08-142423-523 https://www.trngcmd.marines.mil/Portals/207/Docs/TBS/B2B2269...
CamperBob2 4y ago
The impression I'm under is that the Ukraine forces have the will and the training to succeed, and maybe the manpower and intel, but not the weapons. And for some reason, we (meaning the rest of the civilized world) are dragging our feet on giving/lending them better hardware. Frustrating to watch.
- seoaeu 4y ago
  No idea if your impression is true or not. But if I was in charge of Ukrainian propaganda, I can’t think of a better story to tell allied nations so they’d donate lots of weapons
  - CamperBob2 4y ago
    A simple reading of 1930s world history is all the "story" we should need. When a Hitler or a Putin tells you what they intend to do, believe them.
- thrwy_meta 4y ago
  We airlifted M777 howitzers to them in the blink of an eye, by the standards of government/military bureaucracy. Meanwhile out here in the First Island Chain we've been begging for reinforcements/gear/funding for the inevitable fight with China and THAT shit is definitely being slow-walked in comparison. There are also larger issues to consider beyond just "we want the help the Ukrainians". The best stuff we can send has a bunch of sensitive NATO/US technical information (radio comms, etc.). Do we want to risk that gear falling into Russian hands (and by extension probably getting shared with China)? If the answer is "no", we either have to send alternatives or send the equipment to depot maintenance areas to have the sensitive tech removed. That takes time. Do we want to risk escalating the war outside of Ukraine, if the Russians respond kinetically to armaments shipments? The answer is again an emphatic "no" from almost every nation except maybe Poland. Hence the popular snarky refrain: "NATO will fight Russia to the last drop of Ukrainian blood". Western governments and people will "stand with Ukraine" as long as it doesn't involve them really risking anything (such as themselves being on the receiving end of Russian missiles or artillery).

>, but against a modern armed force they wouldn't stand a chance. They seem to be doing quite well against the modern army of Ukraine, NATO-trained for 7-8 years now.

yks 4y ago

The line of engagement barely moved in 3 months all the while Ukraine is hopelessly outgunned, Russians are doing quite well indeed /s. In reality UAF wasn't even a really modern army, just more modern than Russia, and all their "NATO" training in effect started in 2014. Where do people get the impression that Russian army is strong and capable is beyond me, they just throw people into the meat grinder and sit on top of the infinite Soviet arsenal of old equipment.

thrwy_meta 4y ago
A properly-sized invasion force given the physical size of Ukraine, and the size of its army, should have been 400,000-600,000 strong. Russia went in with <200,000, with its force structure badly allocated (not enough infantrymen or logistics guys), and has still managed to occupy a land area larger than Portugal + Ireland combined. And they've done that with essentially their peacetime standing forces. From the perspective of how the Russian army is "supposed" to fight (with a massive mobilization to flesh out its units), this invasion is essentially with one hand tied behind its back by improper force design/employment, and the other tied by rampant corruption. Still, Russia is beating Ukraine to death with headbutts...and also suffering a TBI in the process. "Quantity has a quality all its own". They aren't considered "strong" because individual Russian battalions are expert warfighters per se. They're considered "strong" because the Russian military-industrial complex in its totality is not something that can be idly ignored by anyone except maybe the US or China. Basically Russia scores high on 3 particular Principles of War: Mass, Offensive, and Simplicity. Not so well on the other 6 though. https://www.trngcmd.marines.mil/Portals/207/Docs/TBS/B2B2269%20Tactical%20Fundamentals.pdf?ver=2015-06-08-142423-523 https://www.trngcmd.marines.mil/Portals/207/Docs/TBS/B2B2269...

CamperBob2 4y ago

The impression I'm under is that the Ukraine forces have the will and the training to succeed, and maybe the manpower and intel, but not the weapons. And for some reason, we (meaning the rest of the civilized world) are dragging our feet on giving/lending them better hardware. Frustrating to watch.

seoaeu 4y ago
No idea if your impression is true or not. But if I was in charge of Ukrainian propaganda, I can’t think of a better story to tell allied nations so they’d donate lots of weapons
- CamperBob2 4y ago
  A simple reading of 1930s world history is all the "story" we should need. When a Hitler or a Putin tells you what they intend to do, believe them.
thrwy_meta 4y ago
We airlifted M777 howitzers to them in the blink of an eye, by the standards of government/military bureaucracy. Meanwhile out here in the First Island Chain we've been begging for reinforcements/gear/funding for the inevitable fight with China and THAT shit is definitely being slow-walked in comparison. There are also larger issues to consider beyond just "we want the help the Ukrainians". The best stuff we can send has a bunch of sensitive NATO/US technical information (radio comms, etc.). Do we want to risk that gear falling into Russian hands (and by extension probably getting shared with China)? If the answer is "no", we either have to send alternatives or send the equipment to depot maintenance areas to have the sensitive tech removed. That takes time. Do we want to risk escalating the war outside of Ukraine, if the Russians respond kinetically to armaments shipments? The answer is again an emphatic "no" from almost every nation except maybe Poland. Hence the popular snarky refrain: "NATO will fight Russia to the last drop of Ukrainian blood". Western governments and people will "stand with Ukraine" as long as it doesn't involve them really risking anything (such as themselves being on the receiving end of Russian missiles or artillery).