3 ms·
If you're going that route, everything is influenced by anything, and with a sufficiently advanced sensor array you could detect a butterfly flapping its wing a
by loup-vaillant 4y ago
If you're going that route, everything is influenced by anything, and with a sufficiently advanced sensor array you could detect a butterfly flapping its wing across the globe.
If instead we get serious for a minute, we can notice that cryptography is not magic, and neither is the way data flows from secrets to timings. Quite obviously, whether a program's timings depends on its inputs or not is a function of the hardware it runs on more than anything else.
As long as energy consumption does not meaningfully influenced timings, we're actually in very good shape. Most CPUs have constant time arithmetic (multiplication may be more problematic), and the only way data flows from secrets to timings are branches and the cache. All we have to do is avoid secret dependent branches and secret dependent indices.
When energy does influence timings (frequency scaling, listening at an audio feed…), we're basically screwed, because no CPU instruction is constant energy. No way we can fix this without help from the hardware.
> coding up a constant time crypto and especially making it portable over time and architectures, is nearly impossible.
Sure. I'll settle for constant time now with my hardware. And I'll ask hardware vendors to pretty please sell me hardware that makes it possible.
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In the mean time, I'll see what this new finding actually leads. I don't anticipate major disruption to be honest. The attack demonstrated here required 36 hours, in the lab. This is a far cry from AES cache timing attacks which took 65 milliseconds. I'll wait and see what actually breaks in realistic threat models.