4 ms·
Concerning Many Worlds: Firstly, [1] disagrees with you. Secondly, there is a difference between accepting MWI above other interpretations and actually believi
by Confusion 15y ago
Concerning Many Worlds:
Firstly, [1] disagrees with you. Secondly, there is a difference between accepting MWI above other interpretations and actually believing in multiple parallel universes. A difference between accepting the physical and the metaphysical consequences. Thirdly and crucially, MWI depends on QM. Everyone acknowledges QM is probably not a definite description of the universe and non-locality, non-contextuality or another kind of modification would wreak havoc on MWI. If physicists subscribe to MWI but also acknowledge QM seems incomplete, they are being inconsistent.
Concerning determinism:
You say "it's just basic reductionism". But in fact it presupposes reductionism as a viable strategy to determine 'the truth' about determinism. It isn't [2]. Specifically, the question whether we can even determine whether our fundamental theories are deterministic is still wide open. None of the theories, from classical mechanics to quantum mechanics, is clearly deterministic and it remains a question whether it can even be determined whether they are deterministic.
Concerning morality:
No matter how well you can 'measure' my 'true' ethical views on abortion: no measurement will ever tell you what my ethical view on abortion should be. No collection of measurements will ever tell you what a governments policy on abortion should be. At most you can hope to be able to say: in this particular case we should allow it, because that will be best for everyone: the average happiness, productivity and insert-factor-of-importance will be highest if we allow it. However, that kind of judgment presupposes a certain moral system. You can never determine which factors should be important. At most you can measure which factors people rate as most important on average. But again, you presuppose a certain moral system if you choose to use that measurement to determine what to do. If you feel otherwise, there's a large philosophical nut left for you to crack.
I think you underestimate the complexity of these subjects and that your verdicts are premature.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation#Reception http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation#Rece...
[2] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/
- Umofomia 15y agoBTW, you guys keep talking about MWI, while the original article is categorically not about MWI. The author describes a Tegmark Level I Multiverse[1], the most conservative of the multiverse models. MWI is Level III, and the author himself says in a subsequent comment[2]: What I've presented, above, is the argument for the first type of Multiverse, which I think is correct, and hence, which I believe in. I think that anything beyond that is too speculative to be believed at this point, at least with any sort of confidence. At least, by me. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse#Level_I:_Beyond_our_cosmological_horizon http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse#Level_I:_Beyond_our_... [2] http://scienceblogs.com/startswithabang/2011/10/why_we_think_theres_a_multiver.php#comment-5674646 http://scienceblogs.com/startswithabang/2011/10/why_we_think...