3 ms·

Unfortunately, side-channel attacks like this (or like Meltdown, Spectre, TLBleed, Foreshadow, etc...) only have negligible real-world impact. They are very int

Unfortunately, side-channel attacks like this (or like Meltdown, Spectre, TLBleed, Foreshadow, etc...) only have negligible real-world impact. They are very interesting from a theoretical point of view, but are usually totally impractical for a plethora of reasons. Therefore, chip designers aren't really pressured into thinking about new chip designs. The sad reality is that something like Log4Shell, which is super boring from a theoretical point of view, is much more practical for attackers to exploit.

raxxorraxor 4y ago
I would say fortunately, but I agree. These security flaws need to be analyzed but I don't think it can compete in threat level with the usual phishing mail. Analysis of such vectors is important but the threat is limited. I still favor running encryption in software and find hardware support often quite dubious because you can never be sure here while any runtime attack can just as well be mitigated on a higher level. Doesn't mean it is more secure out of the box but security is about trust as well.
ayende 4y ago
Spectre & Meltdown had a huge impact of the performance of cloud computing. They are certainly putting pressure on the CPUs. See: https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=article&item=3-years-specmelt&num=9 https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=article&item=3-years-...
int0x2e 4y ago
Their impact on you or me may be negligible. If you were targeted by a determined adversary however - their impact can be total breakdown of your privacy. If I were a journalist / human rights / opposition activist, I would assume this is being actively used by at least some adversary out there, and would gladly pay the price on perf.
UncleMeat 4y ago
I think that this is shortsighted. It is a new area and there is a lot of work improving the effectiveness of these things. If somebody told me that ROP was totally impractical for a plethora of reasons when it was first proposed, I would have believed them. Now, we've got completely automated tools to generate ROP chains without hardly any access to a binary whatsoever. These sorts of attacks will get more sophisticated. Side channels through miss-speculation also have a fun property of being virtually undetectable since the problematic code never actually executes. This is attractive for very powerful actors who might want to spend the extra effort for the covert attack even if there are simpler exploits to actually launch.

raxxorraxor 4y ago

I would say fortunately, but I agree. These security flaws need to be analyzed but I don't think it can compete in threat level with the usual phishing mail. Analysis of such vectors is important but the threat is limited. I still favor running encryption in software and find hardware support often quite dubious because you can never be sure here while any runtime attack can just as well be mitigated on a higher level. Doesn't mean it is more secure out of the box but security is about trust as well.

ayende 4y ago

Spectre & Meltdown had a huge impact of the performance of cloud computing. They are certainly putting pressure on the CPUs. See: https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=article&item=3-years-specmelt&num=9 https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=article&item=3-years-...

int0x2e 4y ago

Their impact on you or me may be negligible. If you were targeted by a determined adversary however - their impact can be total breakdown of your privacy. If I were a journalist / human rights / opposition activist, I would assume this is being actively used by at least some adversary out there, and would gladly pay the price on perf.

UncleMeat 4y ago

I think that this is shortsighted. It is a new area and there is a lot of work improving the effectiveness of these things. If somebody told me that ROP was totally impractical for a plethora of reasons when it was first proposed, I would have believed them. Now, we've got completely automated tools to generate ROP chains without hardly any access to a binary whatsoever. These sorts of attacks will get more sophisticated. Side channels through miss-speculation also have a fun property of being virtually undetectable since the problematic code never actually executes. This is attractive for very powerful actors who might want to spend the extra effort for the covert attack even if there are simpler exploits to actually launch.