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I don't care! There, I said it. I didn't care about Spectre, Meltdown, or any of the other obscure timing side-channels that came after them either, because t
by userbinator 4y ago
I don't care!
There, I said it.
I didn't care about Spectre, Meltdown, or any of the other obscure timing side-channels that came after them either, because they relied on so much detailed information about the environment being attacked that you'd almost certainly be able to get the information you wanted by some much easier way.
Attacking something that doesn't seem to be in much use either doesn't make me any more worried either. Go after e.g. TLS, SSH, AES, RSA, etc. if you want to get our attention, but I suspect that trying this in practice, you're going to be overwhelmed by all the other sources of noise --- especially over a network connection -- that you won't be very successful at all. They mention 36h and 89h to get the key (few dozen bytes), and I assume that was in a basically ideal environment with nothing else to measure.
Those of us familiar with hardware would know that things like this are pretty natural; but unlike these people, we don't go feeding the paranoia machine and driving us even more towards the growing dystopia.
- selcuka 4y ago> they relied on so much detailed information about the environment being attacked A disgruntled, previous employee may easily have access to such information, but nothing else because their credentials had been disabled.
- kelnos 4y agoI think you overestimate what kind of information most employees -- even those who build the software that runs on their servers -- have about their execution environments.
- iratewizard 4y agoSure, but at one point in time I had the names, addresses, social security numbers, DoBs and in-patient statuses of around 20k people. I didn't want it or like that it was there, but it was due to carelessness. Or the time I found a client database was actually a flat file with usernames, emails and passwords in plain text. Hertzbleed is out of a sci-fi movie. The stuff a lot of developers come across is not exploited sheerly out of professionalism.
- userbinator 4y agoIt also requires having access to continuously "challenge", for many hours, a server which seemingly has no other processing to do but running this one crypto algorithm in an otherwise noise-free environment.
- kelnos 4y agoSame here. I just can't get worked up about these anymore. It was a while before Spectre and Meltdown were fully mitigated in most OSes, and I imagine there are a lot of appliance-like devices out there that aren't fixed and will never get fixed. And yet where's the news of all the active exploits floating around, being used to ruin people's day? Sure, no evidence doesn't mean evidence of nothing, but I think we have a lot more to worry about than stuff like this. Especially given that Hertzbleed's target for their research was SIKE, which... I'd barely heard of it until now.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- stefan_ 4y agoI was rather disappointed as well. The original *bleed attack had private keys coming right out of the response stream, but this hasn't demonstrated anything close to that. Sure, the theory is sound but the practice seems to be more of an educational setup.
- ziddoap 4y ago>we don't go feeding the paranoia machine and driving us even more towards the growing dystopia. It's an academic research paper with a website and a logo, it's not like they're broadcasting on the 6pm news. Would you rather the research not be done at all? Or just not posted on the websites you visit?
- userbinator 4y agowith a website and a logo it's not like they're broadcasting on the 6pm news They clearly wanted to get publicity, and didn't mention much how contrived the scenario they "attacked" really was. Heartbleed was deserving of its logo and dedicated website; this one is nowhere near in severity but tries to act like it is.