3 ms·
The attackers do not read the CPU frequency, they estimate it based on the latency of the replies to their queries. The attack works only for certain combinati
by adrian_b 4y ago
The attackers do not read the CPU frequency, they estimate it based on the latency of the replies to their queries.
The attack works only for certain combinations of CPUs and cryptographic algorithms that contain a mixture of instructions that cause a CPU to lower its clock frequency, with instructions that allow the CPU to raise its clock frequency.
For such combinations, algorithms that are supposed to be executed in constant time are actually executed in a variable time, creating a side-channel.
As a response to Hertzbleed, Intel has published a guide for those who write cryptographic libraries, about how to mitigate this vulnerability:
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/frequency-throttling-side-channel-guidance.html https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/t...
The main problem that creates this vulnerabilty is that the CPU vendors publish very little information about their turbo algorithms, so, unless you make your own measurements, it is very difficult for a software writer to predict at which clock frequency will be executed a certain segment of a program, and what should be done to avoid changes in the clock frequency.