5 ms·
I suspect what we are seeing in the last few years is the slow death of purely symmetric multiprocessing. At the end of this I wonder if we'll see processors wi
by hinkley 4y ago
I suspect what we are seeing in the last few years is the slow death of purely symmetric multiprocessing. At the end of this I wonder if we'll see processors with one or two cores dedicated to cryptographic primitives, where the ALU has a fixed IPC, the core has a very limited number of clock rates, and the caches are sized to prevent eviction when running common cryptographic algorithms.
- ChrisLomont 4y agoOne or two cores for crypto would likely be susceptible to the same attacks, unless you don't let any user (or kernel) programs run crypto on those cores, making them useless. Any resource that needs scheduled will likely be attackable - either by timing on context switches, or flooding the resource with users and measuring things, and so on. Likely any scheduling method for those resources can leak information.
- hgomersall 4y agoPresumably you can schedule only on non-information-leaking-boundaries with very high level APIs?
- ChrisLomont 4y ago>non-information-leaking-boundaries Every one of the recent leaking boundaries were assumed to be non-leaking. You cannot just inject "non-leaking" into a statement and assume that solves anything.
- hgomersall 4y agoSure, but you can mitigate against all known attacks. You can also mitigate against the class of attacks by, for example, not allowing multitasking and forcing single task to completion (within a dedicated core for a subset of operations).
- tux3 4y agoI don't see how a fixed-frequency crypto core would be susceptible to the same attack, assuming proper constant-time cryto code. This attack exploits the fact that cycles are not constant time, so although crypto primitives are constant in terms of cycle, due to DVFS they're not really constant in terms of time. If the crypto core doesn't have DVFS and runs constant-cycle crypto, it doesn't matter that the core is contended and that you can measure the contention. You'll be measuring how many people are using the resource, but that won't tell you anything about the secret data, just about how much data there is.
- ChrisLomont 4y ago>fixed-frequency crypto core would be susceptible to the same attack, I also added there are other attacks. Once you are allowing multiple processes to utilize these limited crypto cores, you're gonna leak information. And fixed frequency makes many attacks easier - the attacker no longer has to work through variances in performance due to all the randomness in chips from power and caches and other timing things. >assuming proper constant-time cryto code Yeah, that's exactly what the SIKE authors had assumed too. Turns out that it broke. The point is once you allow things to be scheduled, it's nearly impossible to prevent information from leaking. My task asks for some crypto to be done - if fast, there was less in front. If slow, there was more in front. "Randomize!" the geek says - this nearly never works because random assumes some distribution, and again I can now keep poking at the scheduling to find the differences in behavior by statistical sampling. There is no free lunch here.
- rictic 4y agoWhat can an attacker do by knowing how many much queued crypto work there is?
- ChrisLomont 4y agoThere's lots of attacks currently on existing systems exploiting this. Leaking any information about other processes or supposedly hidden state of the system means you are leaking - and attacks always get better, not worse. The point is once you have shared, scheduled resources, others are going to get knowledge that they should not have. The rough idea is, say some other process is repeatedly running some known code with an unknown key, and you want to get that key. By fiddling with how you schedule your requests, you can interrupt or interject his work and your work, and the timing issues due to scheduling have been shown to leak things. Say one process is dealing with web requests, signing things fairly often. An attacker on the same machine can craft web requests, learn how the shared system is responding, and glean information about the web server via timing. This type of poking has been used to leak AES keys by exploiting things thought safe until they were on shared resources.
- culpable_pickle 4y agoWouldn’t the TPM fit those requirements, presuming it could be sped up enough for the required workload
- fomine3 4y agoCurrently TPM is connected via very narrow bus.
- loup-vaillant 4y agoYeah, it's good enough for decrypting message headers then handing the rest of the decryption to the much more powerful main CPU. But having it handle the whole encryption? You're going to wait a while.
- Too 4y agoThis transition has already begun and is to large extent already usable on many platforms. Macs have secure enclave, Android has Trusty and Strongbox, Intel TPM, ARM Trustzone, etc. Some of these are just implemented as VMs on same core though, so could in theory be vulnerable to same type of attack.
- xurukefi 4y agoUnfortunately, side-channel attacks like this (or like Meltdown, Spectre, TLBleed, Foreshadow, etc...) only have negligible real-world impact. They are very interesting from a theoretical point of view, but are usually totally impractical for a plethora of reasons. Therefore, chip designers aren't really pressured into thinking about new chip designs. The sad reality is that something like Log4Shell, which is super boring from a theoretical point of view, is much more practical for attackers to exploit.
- raxxorraxor 4y agoI would say fortunately, but I agree. These security flaws need to be analyzed but I don't think it can compete in threat level with the usual phishing mail. Analysis of such vectors is important but the threat is limited. I still favor running encryption in software and find hardware support often quite dubious because you can never be sure here while any runtime attack can just as well be mitigated on a higher level. Doesn't mean it is more secure out of the box but security is about trust as well.
- ayende 4y agoSpectre & Meltdown had a huge impact of the performance of cloud computing. They are certainly putting pressure on the CPUs. See: https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=article&item=3-years-specmelt&num=9 https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=article&item=3-years-...
- int0x2e 4y agoTheir impact on you or me may be negligible. If you were targeted by a determined adversary however - their impact can be total breakdown of your privacy. If I were a journalist / human rights / opposition activist, I would assume this is being actively used by at least some adversary out there, and would gladly pay the price on perf.
- UncleMeat 4y agoI think that this is shortsighted. It is a new area and there is a lot of work improving the effectiveness of these things. If somebody told me that ROP was totally impractical for a plethora of reasons when it was first proposed, I would have believed them. Now, we've got completely automated tools to generate ROP chains without hardly any access to a binary whatsoever. These sorts of attacks will get more sophisticated. Side channels through miss-speculation also have a fun property of being virtually undetectable since the problematic code never actually executes. This is attractive for very powerful actors who might want to spend the extra effort for the covert attack even if there are simpler exploits to actually launch.