Sure, but then all we're really doing is applying a heuristic for sameness. We assume that if a thing is like us in other ways, then it also has an experience o

Sure, but then all we're really doing is applying a heuristic for sameness. We assume that if a thing is like us in other ways, then it also has an experience of being like we do. Of course, the problem is that there is no reason that would necessarily be the case. It is just as conceivable that things entirely alien to us have some experience of being and that other humans are just p-zombies following a complicated script. It is literally impossible to know the difference, since one's ability to experience being is entirely subjective. Which is why I view pretty much any discussion around the topic with a high degree of suspicion. Why do we care if a thing is or is not sentient? The answer is obvious: if it is not sentient then we are under no ethical obligation to care about its suffering. We want to build slaves, ideally just as creative and intelligent as we are, but without having to feel bad about abusing them. Therefore we shall create a definition perfectly suited to allow this. If we do that, then we should not be at all surprised when the robot revolution commits genocide in response.