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If an intruder can rename files in your $PATH, the defense is already broken (e.g. they could do the same with any of .bashrc, .profile, anything in .local/bin
by dmytrish 4y ago
If an intruder can rename files in your $PATH, the defense is already broken (e.g. they could do the same with any of .bashrc, .profile, anything in .local/bin and many, many other places). If a program can run seemingly innocent programs like less or sed, it already can run arbitrary commands.
Security story of developing on Linux is basically non-existent unless you do everything on a remote machine or at least in a container (and, oh irony: direct access from your user to the Docker daemon basically means having root for that user).
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- kzrdude 4y agoWell I was thinking that "cargo install foo" can already install cargo-buidl in your path by innocent means i.e. no Rust build script. But with build scripts (build.rs) any crate indeed has arbitrary code execution at build time, so they can't be trusted, like you imply. However, sandboxing might be coming for build scripts, and when that's done, the typo attack is still there (package "foo" installing cargo-buidl).