3 ms·

That's fair. I guess the way I think about it, "a computer executing a set of instructions in its registers" is general enough to cover any arrangement of silic

That's fair. I guess the way I think about it, "a computer executing a set of instructions in its registers" is general enough to cover any arrangement of silicon that would be potentially interesting. But now that you mention it, the set of arrangements which aren't (essentially) isomorphic to a turing machine, and yet exhibit rich interesting behaviors, possibly resembling things like conceptualization or natural language ability—would be very interesting to consider, though it seems unclear at this point whether we'll ever find an example. > I don't see why the right arrangement of ordinary molecules can't result in consciousness. This is covered by the "hard problem" of consciousness. It is hard because it appears to be by definition something incapable of expression through ordinary physical relations.

kareemsabri 4y ago
I think the hard problem is primarily why we have consciousness, and why it evolved versus us just being automatons controlled by our brains, more so than the physical mechanism by which it is implemented, though I sometimes see it presented as both. Thankfully we don't need to solve the hard problem to say that computers don't have it. But I don't see why consciousness is "by definition something incapable of expression through ordinary physical relations". What definitionally makes consciousness prohibited by the physical world?
- westoncb 4y ago
  > What definitionally makes consciousness prohibited by the physical world? "consciousness" is too broad a term—I only mean to refer to the aspect of it dealt with in "the hard problem". The hard problem deals with the existence of subjectivity itself. All other aspects of consciousness, e.g. "self-awareness" can at least in principle by thought of as producible by some type of system architecture (in the case of self-awareness, the system needs at least two layers, the upper one operating on data which represents the state of the lower one—i.e. it operates on a model of self; a vast simplification, but maybe it clarifies a bit). But when you try to do the same thing with the existence of subjectivity itself, it doesn't really make sense. It isn't any kind of "system," it's not even a behavior, not something with any kind of state evolving over time, not reducible to separate parts, etc. The "by definition" part is most clear if you think of subjectivity as "the field of qualia present at any moment"—a concept also sometimes referred to as "immediate experience". Thinking of subjectivity in terms of a qualia field which is "immediately present" to consciousness (i.e. there is no mediation; it is in fact the only thing we're immediately in contact with as conscious subjects), it's easier to see specifically why it has the characteristics listed above which make it not producible by any kind of "system," and all the things we can do by re-arranging physical materials, e.g. molecules, can be described through the concept of a system (something with parts and relations between them and some kind of consistency in behavior).

kareemsabri 4y ago

I think the hard problem is primarily why we have consciousness, and why it evolved versus us just being automatons controlled by our brains, more so than the physical mechanism by which it is implemented, though I sometimes see it presented as both. Thankfully we don't need to solve the hard problem to say that computers don't have it. But I don't see why consciousness is "by definition something incapable of expression through ordinary physical relations". What definitionally makes consciousness prohibited by the physical world?

westoncb 4y ago
> What definitionally makes consciousness prohibited by the physical world? "consciousness" is too broad a term—I only mean to refer to the aspect of it dealt with in "the hard problem". The hard problem deals with the existence of subjectivity itself. All other aspects of consciousness, e.g. "self-awareness" can at least in principle by thought of as producible by some type of system architecture (in the case of self-awareness, the system needs at least two layers, the upper one operating on data which represents the state of the lower one—i.e. it operates on a model of self; a vast simplification, but maybe it clarifies a bit). But when you try to do the same thing with the existence of subjectivity itself, it doesn't really make sense. It isn't any kind of "system," it's not even a behavior, not something with any kind of state evolving over time, not reducible to separate parts, etc. The "by definition" part is most clear if you think of subjectivity as "the field of qualia present at any moment"—a concept also sometimes referred to as "immediate experience". Thinking of subjectivity in terms of a qualia field which is "immediately present" to consciousness (i.e. there is no mediation; it is in fact the only thing we're immediately in contact with as conscious subjects), it's easier to see specifically why it has the characteristics listed above which make it not producible by any kind of "system," and all the things we can do by re-arranging physical materials, e.g. molecules, can be described through the concept of a system (something with parts and relations between them and some kind of consistency in behavior).