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I do think some of your points are good, but please do carefully look at which things you're taking for granted as axioms. E.g., you say you believe that senso

I do think some of your points are good, but please do carefully look at which things you're taking for granted as axioms. E.g., you say you believe that sensory input is required for qualia, but does that mean that you think that the hypothetical "brain in a vat" would feel no qualia at all? That does not seem true to me. I think that brain would probably be very scared and would have dreams or hallucinations to make up for the lack of input. > The laws of physics do not allow for emergence of consciousness from My point is that we don't know this. The phenomenal binding problem is one of the great unsolved problems today. Without understanding something as relatively "simple" as a complete theory of quantum mechanics, I don't see how we could yet have a theory of phenomenal binding, which probably requires a complete theory of quantum physics before even beginning to start on the binding problem, if I would guess at the research timeline involved. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binding_problem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binding_problem

slowmovintarget 4y ago
We need a theory of emergence to solve the binding problem, if it even is a problem. A complete theory of quantum gravity would likely still not tell us how consciousness works. So my point is, we do know this. We know exactly what is going on in an electric circuit, to the extent that we can rule out entirely that it is suffering. A brain in a vat that had always only been in a vat would feel no qualia. Real brains are fed a constant stream of sensation even before birth. I think a brain in a vat would simply die without stimulus.