4 ms·
The "web of trust" is the canonical example of "self-sovereign" identity: you publish your identity, others verify it, and (in theory) the "web" propagates thro
by woodruffw 4y ago
The "web of trust" is the canonical example of "self-sovereign" identity: you publish your identity, others verify it, and (in theory) the "web" propagates through degrees of trust in peers.
The big problem there is that it doesn't scale beyond a small handful of people who know each other well and trust each other for a specific purpose. Cryptocurrency companies seem to be aware of this (and of the prominent historical record of failure associated with WoT), which might be why they perform remarkable contortions to avoid that phrase (see "web of verifications" in the article.)
- ggm 4y agoPutting crypto currency to one side, you are aware of the pgp 'strong set'? because six degrees of Kevin Bacon says a handful is a serious underestimate of how good transitive trust can be. The strong set is quite large. That word "transitive" is a very important qualifier here: it's weaker than an absolute statement but hierarchical PKI turns out to be weaker than theory, in practice. Crypto coins are trash. Signatures are not trash. Behaviour of people and systems performing signing including HSM operators are mutable and worrisome.
- woodruffw 4y agoI'm aware of the strong set, but I was under the impression that it didn't accomplish much anymore -- GnuPG disabled SKS lookups a while back, in response to the network's inability to handle thousands of clearly malicious key attestations. The last major topological analysis I can find of the strong set was back in 2015, one year before the first series of spam attacks on SKS. (But don't get me wrong: signatures are great! I'm just skeptical of the WoT, from multiple angles.)
- ggm 4y agoAs usual I'm behind the times. It peaked at 60,000 in 2018 and declined and people stopped believing in it around 2020, some people earlier. My point about scale was a footnote to history, not relevant.
- imwillofficial 4y agoDon’t feel bad, so there so much happening in so many spaces these days. What a time to be alive.
- dane-pgp 4y agoI do think there is some potential in the idea of people proving they are at face-to-face events (signing each others' zero-knowledge tokens) and then timing/placing those events such that someone can't be in two places at once. However, doing graph-based Sybil detection is already a hard problem[0], and trying to create an infallible algorithm that also works using homomorphic encryption is maybe pushing beyond the boundaries of known technology, unfortunately. [0] https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2492517.2492568 https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2492517.2492568
- justincormack 4y agoIt would still be easy to have more tokens than people in this setup, you could choose which of your tokens to present, or pass some tokens around. So it is hard to guarantee there is a 1:1 correspondance. Which could be a good thing, but also doesn't work for some of the cases that want 1:1, like giving people a universal basic income where you don't want them to create fake people.
- hinkley 4y agoIt also has the Byzantine problem where if you have enough wealth and your web is covetous enough, they can conspire to trick you into giving away financial information. The birth of brand names was all about attaching enough status to a product line that if you ever broke that trust, that you harm yourself more than you did the customers. CAs are built on that idea. But then so is BP, 3M, and DuPont. So was Hooker Chemical Company (Love Canal), and Montrose Chemical Corp (DDT dumping off California). So I don't know what that really buys you. I do think that trust in certificates needs to be incremental, especially when they change. And perhaps you need a way to ask your savvy friend to take a hard look at some and be able to veto them.