I don't know what the correct definition is, but I will take the author's definition for the sake of argument: >In this view, consciousness isn’t a mysterious

I don't know what the correct definition is, but I will take the author's definition for the sake of argument: >In this view, consciousness isn’t a mysterious ghost in the machine, but merely the word we use to describe what it’s “like” to model ourselves and others. >When we model others who are modelling us in turn, we must carry out the procedure to higher orders: what do they think we think? What might they imagine a mutual friend thinks about me? While I certainly buy that this sort of modeling is one effective way to be good at the language modeling task, I am unconvinced that it is the only way, and thus the fact that the networks are undeniably very good at the language modeling task does not necessarily imply they are doing so through consciousness (as defined above), or something on the road to consciousness.