3 ms·
> Part of your premise is that you can know when an election is going to come down to 6 votes. Not in reality, you appended that to your local model. It's tru
by mistermann 4y ago
> Part of your premise is that you can know when an election is going to come down to 6 votes.
Not in reality, you appended that to your local model.
It's true that there is only so much fraud you can get away with, and if the legitimate votes outnumber your ballot stuffing then your plan failed.
Presumably fraudsters do not know what the final counts are going to be (unlike how many people in this thread "know" things they have no way of knowing), so this would not necessarily alter their plans on sites that are plausibly (in their estimation) swingable.
> But in fact Meeks vs. Hart was newsworthy because results like that are incredibly rare. 99 times out of 100, if you try to juke the election, you're putting yourself at pretty grave legal risk and accomplishing absolutely nothing.
This rests on the premise of omniscience, and while this is a fairly standard convention on the internet these days, there is no scientific evidence I've seen that substantiates the phenomenon.
- tptacek 4y agoI'm not sure I understand what you're saying here. Which part of the risk/reward equation I've presented do you disagree with? That the reward is higher than I think it is? Can you be specific as to how many votes you think you'd be able to swing with a scheme targeting e-day voting? Or is it that you think the risk is lower?
- mistermann 4y agoI'm disputing the claim that a premise of the argument is necessarily knowing the final vote count prior to launching the scheme. This knowledge is not actually necessary, although having it would certainly be beneficial.