4 ms·
This is an unnecessarily reductionist interpretation. “Don’t clean and bandage the gaping wound because it’ll just keep bleeding” The point isn’t to stop goin
by haswell 4y ago
This is an unnecessarily reductionist interpretation.
“Don’t clean and bandage the gaping wound because it’ll just keep bleeding”
The point isn’t to stop going after criminals, the point is that just going after criminals is as pointless in the long run as just dressing a wound that actually requires a different solution - stitches.
Given limited resources, addressing the root of the problem would be more valuable than continuing to go after the symptoms.
Since I doubt the same agency would be part of a real solution, it probably becomes a conversation about where funding is directed.
- 2OEH8eoCRo0 4y agoI agree with the core of your argument but I think it's more complicated. If SS weren't important criminals would move onto something else. If you stop going after criminals would there be more or less SS theft? If the solution is to phase out whatever criminals are using against people then you'll just be on a different path that never ends.
- haswell 4y agoI think this is fair. The ideal path is probably not just one or the other, but a combination of both.
- everforward 4y agoThe problem is that a SSN was designed to be secret, and then everyone decided to use them as a UUID for people, which are generally not secret. The solution is to split them. Give everyone some kind of citizen ID number that isn't private, but is unique. Then give everyone some kind of auth mechanism that identifies a person when combined with their ID number. What we currently do is using SSN as the identifier, with DOB as the auth mechanism. That's terrible because the SSN is supposed to be secret, and DOB is basically public knowledge at this point. They also can't be easily re-issued, which is it's own problem. There are obvious and substantial differences between SSN and some of the newer cryptography-based ID cards other countries are using.
- kube-system 4y agoIt's the other way around. SSNs were designed to be UUIDs, and everyone decided to use them as a secret. > At its inception, the SSN's only purpose was to uniquely identify U.S. workers > The card was never intended to serve as a personal identification document—that is, it does not establish that the person presenting the card is actually the person whose name and SSN appear on the card. https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v69n2/v69n2p55.html https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v69n2/v69n2p55.html
- everforward 4y agoYou're right that it wasn't intended that way, but it's incredibly incompetent of them to think it would work that way. They discarded the idea of using names/addresses to identify people because it was unmanageable, so how did they propose people authenticate to these systems if it wasn't via SSN? I.e. if your SSN is a UUID, then what's the password to authenticate into these systems? Your name? That's even less secret than your SSN. Your address? Historically and today, if you want to update the address your checks get sent to, you can send them a letter with your name, SSN, old address and new address. One of those obviously has to be a secret, or anyone can reroute your SSA checks wherever they want. Which one of those is meant to be a secret? Names and addresses are void due to phone books, which only leaves the SSN. That means the SSA is using SSNs as a personal identification document, regardless of whether they claim it was designed that way or not.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]