3 ms·

The word “intended” is right there.

by Ferrotin 4y ago

JumpCrisscross 4y ago
> The word “intended” is right there Right before the word "or."
- Ferrotin 4y ago
  It isn’t “designed” or “used” to racially discriminate if it’s not intended. The word “Intententionally,” specifically, is present in section 706(g) to expressly prevent accidental discrimination from violating Title VII.
  - dragonwriter 4y ago
    > It isn’t “designed” or “used” to racially discriminate if it’s not intended. You are trying to read the qualifications other than “intended“ in 703h into surplusage, since despite the “or”, “intended” would be the one and only consideration in your reading. > The word “Intententionally,” specifically, is present in section 706(g) to expressly prevent accidental discrimination from violating Title VII. 706(g) of the Act, 42 USC 2000e-5(g), deals with the terms for equitable relief (injunctions, focus mostly specifically on injunctions for rehiring with back pay ), which, as is often the case with equitable relief, have higher standards than for legal relief (damages). In it, “intentionally” modifies “engaged in an unlawful employment practice”, which acknowledges that an employment practice may be umlawful without being engaged in intentionally (in which case, the type of remedies in 706(g) are not available, but compensatory damages remain available.)
dragonwriter 4y ago
“not designed, used, or intended” means neither designed, nor used, nor intended. You seem to be insisting that the “or” must be read as an “and” which is, obviously, an affront to the plain language of the test. Not only does the Court in Griggs not ignore the legislative concerns motivating the inclusion of the explicit allowance for testing, it relates the debate, it's proximate cause, and the concern cited, and announces a rule very precisely aimed at avoiding the problem the provision was designed to avoid [see, most particularly, Footnote 10, p. 401 U.S. 434]. While there might, I suppose, be a not-insane argument that the Griggs Court took the wrong view of some elements of the legislative history and context, the claim that they blithely ignored it is untenable on its face.

The word “intended” is right there.

JumpCrisscross 4y ago

> The word “intended” is right there Right before the word "or."

Ferrotin 4y ago
It isn’t “designed” or “used” to racially discriminate if it’s not intended. The word “Intententionally,” specifically, is present in section 706(g) to expressly prevent accidental discrimination from violating Title VII.
- dragonwriter 4y ago
  > It isn’t “designed” or “used” to racially discriminate if it’s not intended. You are trying to read the qualifications other than “intended“ in 703h into surplusage, since despite the “or”, “intended” would be the one and only consideration in your reading. > The word “Intententionally,” specifically, is present in section 706(g) to expressly prevent accidental discrimination from violating Title VII. 706(g) of the Act, 42 USC 2000e-5(g), deals with the terms for equitable relief (injunctions, focus mostly specifically on injunctions for rehiring with back pay ), which, as is often the case with equitable relief, have higher standards than for legal relief (damages). In it, “intentionally” modifies “engaged in an unlawful employment practice”, which acknowledges that an employment practice may be umlawful without being engaged in intentionally (in which case, the type of remedies in 706(g) are not available, but compensatory damages remain available.)

dragonwriter 4y ago

“not designed, used, or intended” means neither designed, nor used, nor intended. You seem to be insisting that the “or” must be read as an “and” which is, obviously, an affront to the plain language of the test. Not only does the Court in Griggs not ignore the legislative concerns motivating the inclusion of the explicit allowance for testing, it relates the debate, it's proximate cause, and the concern cited, and announces a rule very precisely aimed at avoiding the problem the provision was designed to avoid [see, most particularly, Footnote 10, p. 401 U.S. 434]. While there might, I suppose, be a not-insane argument that the Griggs Court took the wrong view of some elements of the legislative history and context, the claim that they blithely ignored it is untenable on its face.