There's a related idea in Hofstadter's GEB, where he asks: if a machine is able to think, will it still be able to do math fast? That is to say, is there a cont

There's a related idea in Hofstadter's GEB, where he asks: if a machine is able to think, will it still be able to do math fast? That is to say, is there a contradiction between the mechanical nature of computers as we have them and intelligent organisms? Embodiment seems similar to this. All existing examples of intelligence we have are in some sense constrained and complex. Either by having to physically interact with the world, by having sophisticated internal states and representations, and so on. I think there's something to that just given the evidence of intelligence we have around us, and it's why I'm skeptical of the extremely popular, but very fictional Skynet-like "idiot savant" that separate operational intelligence both from physical bodies as well as from other states of mind.