Need to do a full read-through, but part of what this paper seems to say is that the System 1 vs. System 2 dichotomy is not the best description of how we make

Need to do a full read-through, but part of what this paper seems to say is that the System 1 vs. System 2 dichotomy is not the best description of how we make decisions. From Page 5: > How can one make sense of such inconsistent behavior? One answer [16] drawn from the multiple-selves model is that our brains have two independent modules: an ‘impulsive’ chooser, which only values immediately available rewards; and a ‘rational’ patient chooser, which values all rewards as a function of the delay-to-reward duration. In this conception, human behavior represents the combined action of these two modules, each internally consistent when acting alone, but yielding strongly intransitive behavior when combined. and page 7: > Could it be that there is a unitary representation of a single utility-like signal, rather than the many competing signals predicted by multiple-selves theory? > At the same time, a similar examination of another behavioral pattern sometimes seen as an inconsistency, loss aversion, yielded similar results [47]. Humans often treat losses relative to the reference point as more consequential than equivalent gains, presumably because losses are more anxiety‐provoking. In this study, brain activity was examined as decision-makers evaluated financial lotteries that involved varying levels of gains and losses. As in intertemporal choice, these data revealed that human choosers were inconsistent, but that this inconsistency did not appear to arise from multiple modules, one only anxious and one only logical. Instead, the study revealed that several brain areas irrationally encoded losses and gains asymmetrically, but not by using multiple independent modules (but see [48] for one counter-example). > A series of three subsequent meta-studies strongly support this conclusion that a single decisionvariable is represented neurally and that emotional and rational evaluations are fully integrated [49–51]. All three of these metastudies, together aggregating data from hundreds of studies, tell the same story. Value representations in the brain do not reflect multiple competing agents. Instead, these data suggest that the irrationalities we observe in behavior reflect a fundamental irrationality in the neural representation of subjective value, in humans, nonhuman primates [52], rodents [53], and perhaps even insects [54]. The representation of subjective value appears fundamentally imperfect, but imperfect in similar ways, in animals separated by hundreds of millions of years of evolution.