> It's not about the keys of the politician. It's about the keys of the manufacturer of the camera. The aim of the signature is to prove that a video did in fac

> It's not about the keys of the politician. It's about the keys of the manufacturer of the camera. The aim of the signature is to prove that a video did in fact come from such camera at such location, at such time. If the goal is to allow a manufacturer to confirm video came from one of their cameras, I think it's somewhat more helpful than I was originally thinking, but it doesn't change my opinion that this technology would only "solve some authenticity problems in some narrow contexts." Namely, stuff like a burglar claiming in court that security camera video was forged to frame them. I don't think it addresses cases of embarrassing/incriminating video filmed by bystanders with rando cameras and other stuff like that. > Of course, if one has physical access to the camera/sensor it's possible to make a fake video with a valid signature. But it's a little more difficult than simply running a deepfake script on some machine in the cloud. If you're faking a video like I described, you certainly would have "physical access to the camera/sensor" that you claim made it. You're making a fake, which means you can concoct a story for the fake's creation involving things that are possible for you to acquire.