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> as a means to avoid locking 2FA to hardware Tying 2FA to hardware is for most of the common use cases a bad idea. Instead always use TOTP and keep the seed i

by jjav 4y ago

> as a means to avoid locking 2FA to hardware Tying 2FA to hardware is for most of the common use cases a bad idea. Instead always use TOTP and keep the seed in a secure storage with multiple backups. If on top of that you like to keep it on your phone to generate the code that way, fine. But at that point you can destroy the phone and it doesn't matter, you'll still have access. > While I don't like passwords and understand their very real security limitations. When used correctly, password are a fairly great solution with fewer limitations than competing solutions. By properly I mean generate yourself 128 bits from /dev/random, never reuse and store securely.

clysm 4y ago
> always use TOTP TOTP can be phished or man-in-the-middle'd and isn't as secure.
- 41b696ef1113 4y ago
  Fair, but I am a nobody that is unlikely to be specifically targeted. I am willing to swing the balance towards convenience/backup safety vs utmost security.
  - drivebycomment 4y ago
    A common misconception. After credential stuffing (which 2nf factor protects you from), your biggest threat (for people with 2nd factor) is phishing and keystoke logger, which does not require any targeted attack. OTP is way less convenient than fido keys, so it's both convenience and security. The only downside is the cost, and the effort required for registering multiple keys which is easily compensated for by the ease of use during authentication than OTP.
    - dividedbyzero 4y ago
      But then I'm not aware of a FIDO key that works with random apps on an iPhone. That's where I, personally, have by far the most logins and spend money. Pretty much all of them support some sort of authenticator app nowadays though.
jupp0r 4y ago
Only if by "never reuse" you mean "never ever log in after the initial login". The problem that WebAuthn/FIDO solves is that even if you read my encrypted communication, you won't be able to use it to gain access to my identity.
- jjav 4y ago
  If you've managed to insert your malicious code in a place where you can bypass TLS, secrecy of the password isn't my main concern anymore, as all is lost. It's not a threat model I worry about in most circumstances (sure there's always exceptions).
- raxxorraxor 4y ago
  A software implementation of WebAuthn requires a TPM module and to be honest I think privacy and user identification are more of a security problem on the web than being phished for passwords. The problem I see with Fido2 is that they consider a far too narrow corridor of threats. Sure, for devices that need to authenticate themselves it is a decent or maybe the best solution. For me as a user? I am not convinced. It cannot compete with passwords.
bigiain 4y ago
> Tying 2FA to hardware is for most of the common use cases a bad idea. For me, I don't consider that to be true. I have a Yubikey on my keyring, and a backup Yubikey in my safe. Losing my keys is an extremely rare thing (I've never actually lost my keys, closest I've come in the last 30 years is temporarily misplacing them or locking them inside). I'm happy enough to deal with losing my digital access (via 2FA) tea[orarily under the same sort of circumstances where I've lost my keys. I might need to call a locksmith to get inside my house/car if I've locked them inside, or possibly to get me inside so I can replace the locks (and get my backup Yubikey out of the safe). When I travel for work, I at least try to make sure I can get into critical systems using TOTP (on my phone and backed up with cloud accessible seeds), to protect against losing th4e Yubikey while abroad. I don't usually bother doing too much of that when I'm on vacation travelling.
- makeitdouble 4y ago
  > I'm happy enough to deal with losing my digital access (via 2FA) temporarily under the same sort of circumstances where I've lost my keys. To me the critical difference would be that my house keys are single purpose and only serve at a single location. I lost/broke keys a few times in my life, and the only issue was to wait outside the house for a few hours. I didn't need to authorize 3d secure transactions when paying for the hotel or a taxi, didn't need to authorize accessing my Gitlab account at work, nor validate that I'm really me in the flurry of 2FA services. Nowadays phones and computers are more akin to wallets, and I'm actually more in trouble when losing access to my phone than when losing my wallet.
  - highwaylights 4y ago
    Absolutely this. I can lose my wallet - I know how much that's realistically going to cost me and I'm protected against fraud and theft regardless, save for the headache of making a few phone calls. The world really hasn't appropriately quantified our reliance on little black fondleslabs.
- smaudet 4y ago
  To echo the sibling commenter, perhaps this rule applies: When dealing with hardware, hardware access tokens should be required. When dealing with software, software access tokens should be required. That way, you never have hardware compromised by remote tokens, and you never lose access to your software because you lost some hardware. E.g., hardware tokens to login to a laptop, but only a software token (password) to get on a flight. Of course there are a lot of use-cases inbetween with varying needs (escrow boxes with digital locks, intelligence services who need to verify the identity of their agents when entering/exiting premises), but I posit those come with requirements outside of the "ordinary".
anony999 4y ago
TOTP is prone to phishing. Not to mention that you still need a password so it's both insecure and hard to use. You could ague that "When used correctly, password are a fairly great solution " but as passwords are flawed they are exploited and even the "experts" happen to fall victims to "improper" use of passwords.
mwwaters 4y ago
Any OTP can be phished. There is no automatic authentication that the OTP is being given to the correct party. A public/private key alone would have a similar issue, but the browser for FIDO keys gives the domain it's actually talking to. The domain is authenticated with TLS or the browser on an uncompromised machine won't send that domain over. The device only signs the challenge with the private key generated for that specific domain.
- oceanplexian 4y ago
  While you're technically correct any authentication system worth it's salt would ideally see the same user trying to authenticate from two different locations, and prompt the second user for another factor of authentication (Email, etc.) And since TOTP expires it's not like they could sit on the token and use it later.
  - mwwaters 4y ago
    The OTP is already a second form of authentication. An email link would be a third form. I never saw that when I used Authenticator. Anyway, the user would likely still click the link in the email since they are trying to log in.

by jjav 4y ago

clysm 4y ago

> always use TOTP TOTP can be phished or man-in-the-middle'd and isn't as secure.

41b696ef1113 4y ago
Fair, but I am a nobody that is unlikely to be specifically targeted. I am willing to swing the balance towards convenience/backup safety vs utmost security.
- drivebycomment 4y ago
  A common misconception. After credential stuffing (which 2nf factor protects you from), your biggest threat (for people with 2nd factor) is phishing and keystoke logger, which does not require any targeted attack. OTP is way less convenient than fido keys, so it's both convenience and security. The only downside is the cost, and the effort required for registering multiple keys which is easily compensated for by the ease of use during authentication than OTP.
  - dividedbyzero 4y ago
    But then I'm not aware of a FIDO key that works with random apps on an iPhone. That's where I, personally, have by far the most logins and spend money. Pretty much all of them support some sort of authenticator app nowadays though.

jupp0r 4y ago

Only if by "never reuse" you mean "never ever log in after the initial login". The problem that WebAuthn/FIDO solves is that even if you read my encrypted communication, you won't be able to use it to gain access to my identity.

jjav 4y ago
If you've managed to insert your malicious code in a place where you can bypass TLS, secrecy of the password isn't my main concern anymore, as all is lost. It's not a threat model I worry about in most circumstances (sure there's always exceptions).
raxxorraxor 4y ago
A software implementation of WebAuthn requires a TPM module and to be honest I think privacy and user identification are more of a security problem on the web than being phished for passwords. The problem I see with Fido2 is that they consider a far too narrow corridor of threats. Sure, for devices that need to authenticate themselves it is a decent or maybe the best solution. For me as a user? I am not convinced. It cannot compete with passwords.

bigiain 4y ago

> Tying 2FA to hardware is for most of the common use cases a bad idea. For me, I don't consider that to be true. I have a Yubikey on my keyring, and a backup Yubikey in my safe. Losing my keys is an extremely rare thing (I've never actually lost my keys, closest I've come in the last 30 years is temporarily misplacing them or locking them inside). I'm happy enough to deal with losing my digital access (via 2FA) tea[orarily under the same sort of circumstances where I've lost my keys. I might need to call a locksmith to get inside my house/car if I've locked them inside, or possibly to get me inside so I can replace the locks (and get my backup Yubikey out of the safe). When I travel for work, I at least try to make sure I can get into critical systems using TOTP (on my phone and backed up with cloud accessible seeds), to protect against losing th4e Yubikey while abroad. I don't usually bother doing too much of that when I'm on vacation travelling.

makeitdouble 4y ago
> I'm happy enough to deal with losing my digital access (via 2FA) temporarily under the same sort of circumstances where I've lost my keys. To me the critical difference would be that my house keys are single purpose and only serve at a single location. I lost/broke keys a few times in my life, and the only issue was to wait outside the house for a few hours. I didn't need to authorize 3d secure transactions when paying for the hotel or a taxi, didn't need to authorize accessing my Gitlab account at work, nor validate that I'm really me in the flurry of 2FA services. Nowadays phones and computers are more akin to wallets, and I'm actually more in trouble when losing access to my phone than when losing my wallet.
- highwaylights 4y ago
  Absolutely this. I can lose my wallet - I know how much that's realistically going to cost me and I'm protected against fraud and theft regardless, save for the headache of making a few phone calls. The world really hasn't appropriately quantified our reliance on little black fondleslabs.
smaudet 4y ago
To echo the sibling commenter, perhaps this rule applies: When dealing with hardware, hardware access tokens should be required. When dealing with software, software access tokens should be required. That way, you never have hardware compromised by remote tokens, and you never lose access to your software because you lost some hardware. E.g., hardware tokens to login to a laptop, but only a software token (password) to get on a flight. Of course there are a lot of use-cases inbetween with varying needs (escrow boxes with digital locks, intelligence services who need to verify the identity of their agents when entering/exiting premises), but I posit those come with requirements outside of the "ordinary".

anony999 4y ago

TOTP is prone to phishing. Not to mention that you still need a password so it's both insecure and hard to use. You could ague that "When used correctly, password are a fairly great solution " but as passwords are flawed they are exploited and even the "experts" happen to fall victims to "improper" use of passwords.

mwwaters 4y ago

Any OTP can be phished. There is no automatic authentication that the OTP is being given to the correct party. A public/private key alone would have a similar issue, but the browser for FIDO keys gives the domain it's actually talking to. The domain is authenticated with TLS or the browser on an uncompromised machine won't send that domain over. The device only signs the challenge with the private key generated for that specific domain.

oceanplexian 4y ago
While you're technically correct any authentication system worth it's salt would ideally see the same user trying to authenticate from two different locations, and prompt the second user for another factor of authentication (Email, etc.) And since TOTP expires it's not like they could sit on the token and use it later.
- mwwaters 4y ago
  The OTP is already a second form of authentication. An email link would be a third form. I never saw that when I used Authenticator. Anyway, the user would likely still click the link in the email since they are trying to log in.