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> just kind of suck at p/w management. The risk/reward ratio doesn't justify it in their lives. It's also a pernicious ratio because there is almost no way to
by akira2501 4y ago
> just kind of suck at p/w management.
The risk/reward ratio doesn't justify it in their lives. It's also a pernicious ratio because there is almost no way to increase the "reward" portion, just decrease "risk."
In my experience, solutions balanced on this type of ratio always fail to solve the fundamental problem. Which is why we have to have commercials that tell people "medicare will _never_ call you. If anyone calls and says they're from medicare, hang up immediately!" So, I'm assuming we can now look forward to "no one will ever call and ask for information from your key, if they do, hang up!"
I also expect a similar outcome.
- moduspol 4y ago> The risk/reward ratio doesn't justify it in their lives. It's also a pernicious ratio because there is almost no way to increase the "reward" portion, just decrease "risk." Eh, my non-tech savvy friends/relatives find themselves guessing at and then finally resetting their password surprisingly frequently. There's some room for "reward" there.
- ChadNauseam 4y ago> So, I'm assuming we can now look forward to "no one will ever call and ask for information from your key, if they do, hang up!" There's usually no way to take your key off your device, so don't worry about that :P
- tialaramex 4y agoI guess it's possible that particularly vulnerable people might be persuaded to physically send the actual device to bad guys. I'd like to hope that existing advice to such people warns them not to send stuff to bad guys, we don't want them sending their credit cards, house keys, etc. to bad guys either.
- supertrope 4y agoMailing keys away would only be economical for targeted attacks. Trojans are more scalable. Even that is a big improvement as malware distribution is harder than credential stuffing, email hijacking, or SIM swap attacks.