4 ms·
>Judging by the fact that master lock is still widely sold, it’s not common knowledge how crap they are. I think you misunderstand the threat model and/or use
by Enginerrrd 4y ago
>Judging by the fact that master lock is still widely sold, it’s not common knowledge how crap they are.
I think you misunderstand the threat model and/or use case. Most of the time I don't think anyone expects locks to do anything except keep honest people honest and dissuade the lowest level of opportunistic attacks.
A sledge hammer is cheap. It can open just about any door. The difference between a cheap door and hardware and a high end security door might be ~5 minutes of hammer time. (Nothing can stop hammer time). Nothing will stop someone with time and tools.
But if that threat model were a concern, we'd see a lot more bars on ground-level windows and the like. No one cares. Because 99.99% of the time, it's not going to be a problem.
Now, there are definitely use cases out there where it makes a big difference and people want the security. But MOST of the time, people aren't trying to stop or slow down someone with bolt cutters, a bump key, or shim.
- mnd999 4y agoA sledge hammer is not subtle. Someone breaking a door with a sledgehammer is very obviously breaking a door. It’s also very obvious in the aftermath that the door has been opened.
- ramses0 4y agoA lock is a delaying device. A lock is (should be) tamper-evident. All locks can (probably) be bypassed (eg: sledgehammer), but it’s best if it is visible that tampering has occurred.
- beardedwizard 4y agoNit: isn't this a threat scenario? Where a composition of scenarios and mitigations relevant to a use case would be the model?