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I'll try that reasoning with my PCI/DSS auditors next time. Let's see what they think about that. If you think I'm being hyperbolic, I'm not. Our org has recen
by majewsky 4y ago
I'll try that reasoning with my PCI/DSS auditors next time. Let's see what they think about that.
If you think I'm being hyperbolic, I'm not. Our org has recently gone through a PCI/DSS audit, and there was a lot of frustration about the amount of required changes with regards to locking down access policies, tracking suspicious activity, enforcing 2FA and such, but most of the stuff that I saw change was stuff that feels like it really should be entirely obligatory in the first place.
There is a great tradition in IT to teach yourselves using free (as well as free-of-charge) software, but when you're in the business of IT, there should be much stricter regulation. If you're a civil engineer and the bridge you design collapses because you did your math wrong, you are criminally liable for the damage. But if you're a software "architect" and you negligently put an instance of database-du-jour on the internet without proper access controls or a vulnerability tracking process, you most often get away by just saying "whoopsie-daisy" and giving a flimsy apology to the millions of customers that had their personal data stolen. Worst case scenario, you get a fee of a few percent of your earnings. That has to end.
- iovrthoughtthis 4y agoim not certain why any of that is at odds with providing secure secret management to employees it's already a part of secret management for machines in secure cloud environments