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This is extremely disingenuous. There are tons of usability issues when you have E2EE, to the point where you'd basically have to redesign Zulip and it wouldn't
by stavros 4y ago
This is extremely disingenuous. There are tons of usability issues when you have E2EE, to the point where you'd basically have to redesign Zulip and it wouldn't work the same way (e.g. how do you add a colleague to a chat channel and have them see old messages that they don't have keys for?).
I'm going to assume good faith in your comment, but I'm really having a hard time doing it, and I'm one of the people who worked for SilentCircle! Another one of those people currently works for Zulip (hey Austin!).
TL;DR: It would take a ton of effort and would basically require a pivot of the business model. Yet you present it as if it's some afterthought that can be tacked on, completely ignoring the fact that all none of their competitors (Slack, Teams, etc) support E2EE.
- noizejoy 4y agoSince you’ve been in the field, and have thought about it a lot more than me: isn’t privacy inversely proportional to the size of group who’s in on the secret? And that’s not even a technology issue. And therefore demanding E2EE for groupware might seem almost nonsensical, since wide proliferation of access keys makes the whole secret room subject to increasing likelihood of accidental or malicious compromise - ending up more privacy theatre than actual privacy? e.g. if there are 1000 different individual keys to access a conversation, how private is that conversation really?
- stavros 4y agoThat makes sense in people terms, but in cryptography terms you treat some people as trusted, and some as untrusted. The goal of E2EE is to keep the two groups entirely separate. However, this does make sense when you consider your attack model. When thousands of people know a secret, maybe forward secrecy isn't worth the trouble, and you can simply have one master key that people share between them (to prevent the server from reading any of the communications). There are tons of issues even then, though. For example, you can't send an email notification to someone and show them the content of the message that mentions them (because you don't know it), plus how do you even know they were mentioned? There are probably hundreds of small issues like that, and the fact that the server knows nothing leads you to push most of the functionality to the clients themselves, which leads to more problems.
- skjoldr 4y agoIf I want my messages to stay away from the public Internet, why would I even want to receive message content over unencrypted email? That makes no sense. Receiving notifications while I am not even logged in also makes little sense because I obviously did not consent to them. And having optional E2EE lets you choose which kinds of messages you don't mind leaking.
- skjoldr 4y agoWait a second, Element has had working optional private and group E2EE for a while, why can't Zulip?
- stavros 4y agoThe simple answer is that that's like asking "boats can float, why can't cars?".
- skjoldr 4y agoIt did require a lot of effort for Element, Element is a competitor to Zulip, and I found the UX around E2EE of Element to be perfectly acceptable and consistent with UX of the previous versions, so your comment was also a bit disingenuous IMO. It is obvious that E2EE would involve a big rework of the codebase, but it is neither impossible nor unnecessary. If there are architectural problems with it, I have to question the original developer intent, as a lot of stuff that E2EE requires to work also improve privacy in general.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- samatman 4y agoIt is deeply unfortunate that a business model stands between open source software and serving the urgent needs of its users. A chat platform should provide E2EE as a matter of course. I of course have no right to demand work from software developers, regardless of the openness of their code base. It's just, that's really too bad.