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> given current pricing for storage https://ourworldindata.org/battery-price-decline https://ourworldindata.org/battery-price-decline Complement: V2G will be
by natmaka 4y ago
> given current pricing for storage
https://ourworldindata.org/battery-price-decline https://ourworldindata.org/battery-price-decline
Complement: V2G will be a key, here.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vehicle-to-grid https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vehicle-to-grid
Many other ways to store will emerge as complements?
> Denmark's current wind power productin already relies on Sweden and Norway to store surplus production in hydro plants.
Such efficient use of available resources is one of the (already actively pursued) benefits of a large grid.
Fully-nuclearized France is nowadays very happy to benefit from Germany's electricity: https://twitter.com/HolzheuStefan/status/1529874075220381696 https://twitter.com/HolzheuStefan/status/1529874075220381696
> this storage capacity will reach its limit
This depends heavily on the efficiency of many parameters, mainly: spreading unit out, mix, other vectors (hydrogen), curtailing, backup.
> the electricity trade is becoming extremely unpopular
A global price raise then ratchet is very probable, and maybe already triggered. Fossil fuels are very convenient and cheap, but the good'ole days are over.
> Such storage is not available for the larger Europen countries, such as Germany
Germany already does it with Switzerland. Some nations need more storage (and other indeed already have too much of it). Storage characteristics (volume, min/max discharge rate, term...) are more and more clear
>> we know how to compensate for most of intermittency by spreading out (at continental scale) production units and using a mix (wind, solar...)
> As far as I can tell, the development has been in the opposite direction. More trade has led to greater fluctuations
Prices fluctuations? I petition that it is an effect of the transition towards renewable sources (from the relative comfort and stable logistics of fossil fuels) more than a problem intrinsic to renewables. Competing markets will cope.
Grid stability is up (by impressive margins) everywhere.
> since many countries produce too little for their own consumption
> Denmark imports 17% of their consumption
Denmark officially targets 84% electricity wind by 2035.
> If this continues, it is highly likely that the Norwegian (and possibly Swedish) governments is forced to withdraw from such cooperation due to public outrage
This is mainly a financial matter. A 'cooperation' achieved thru a market lets some buy production surpluses on the spot market at a bargain, store them then sell with a profit wipes out such outrage. This is already the case for the Germany-Switzerland deal, and a natural way for such deals: surplus is cheap, needed energy isn't. It will boost storage projects and innovation, adjusting the market.
> the only way to reach 100% non-carbon-based power
There is no way, each and every type of source emits and needs combustible fuel backup. The next goal is to transition to reach approximately 10% (max) of such backup, just like France's production fleet does for decades.
> is for consumers to be able to buy it at prices
Yes, a very low LCOE offers financial provisions for the infrastructure (grid, storage...). Renewable sources' LCOE is low and falls sharply. Nuclear-produced electricity cost, on the other hand, is way higher and raises. Surprises (real building costs, waste management, decommission, accident...) may further extend the gap.
> need to add a lot of storage capacity, at least several days
A continental mix reduces this need.
> that this will become realistic around 2050, possibly a bit sooner.
The current (awful) nuclear-building capacity needs a miracle to adjust, restart and gain significant and reinsuring successes before 2050. Even France best hope is to start more than 3 new reactors by 2040.
> levelized costs for nuclear may, for countries able to do it as efficiently as Korea and China, already be there.
China? Not really. There is some opacity, but established facts aren't keen for nuclear projects. 2 to (rarely) 6 new reactors per year. At least some are problematic. Their pair of EPR (Taishan), for example: 5 years late, 60% overbudget, and out of 2 reactors one is stopped since mid-2021 after an incident, and the other one works at low capacity in order to avoid problems.
This trend is old and clear: nuclear produces 6% of China's electricity with 50GW nominal electric power, long-term plans for future capacity are 120 to 150 GW by 2030 ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_China https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_China ) while China already has 253GW solar and 281GW wind (plan for combined solar and wind: 1,200 gigawatts by 2030) ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_power_in_China https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_power_in_China , https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wind_power_in_China https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wind_power_in_China ). In 2020 alone China added 71.6 GW windpower... Even taking into account the load factors (nuclear may reach .9 while wind-solar combined are at .3 to .5, mainly depending on the proportion of off-shore wind turbine power) this seems quite clear to me.
Korea was somewhat efficient while building the Barakah plant (in the United Arab Emirates), however it is not fully started (then time will tell if it runs well), and maybe thanks to some now known dirty tricks https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Korean_nuclear_scandal https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Korean_nuclear_scandal
The last Korean president was against nuclear and practically froze it in Korea.
> If there is enough focus on building affordable nuclear
There is focus. What nuclear needs is successes.
> Europe would be able to shift a significant percentage of its energy production over to emission-free production
Nuclear isn't emission free (building, obtaining the fuel, waste management, decommission... aren't emission-free).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life-cycle_greenhouse_gas_emissions_of_energy_sources#Global_warming_potential_of_selected_electricity_sources https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life-cycle_greenhouse_gas_emis...
> An ideal mix for the total EU area
> 50% nuclear
This seems impossible, at least if we hope for real progress towards an adequate energetic system by 2050.
See https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/elec-mix-bar?time=latest&country=Europe~FRA https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/elec-mix-bar?time=latest&...
Year 2000: 27% nuclear / 19%
2022: 23% / 35%
There are 106 active nuclear reactors in Europe, producing 23% of its electricity. Therefore to produce 40% of it we need to build approx 80 new reactors. Theoretically a bit less, as more recent types are more powerful, however we have to account for replacements (many existing ones are quite old). Who really hopes to build ~80 new reactors in Europe before 2100?
In any case who will build them?
Even France, historically nuclear's king, tries hard to build but: 27/19 (2000) to 23/35 (now)
French Areva NP is dead. Its successor EDF, with its hands full thanks to 2 projects (a disaster at Flamanville and a difficult one at Hinkley Point C)?
Westinghouse filled for Chapter 11 ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westinghouse_Electric_Company https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westinghouse_Electric_Company ) and Toshiba recently sold it to BBP ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brookfield_Business_Partners https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brookfield_Business_Partners ): not sure which european nation would order anything from them(?)
GE Hitachi is fleeing the European market after the Horizon debacle ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horizon_Nuclear_Power https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horizon_Nuclear_Power ), and probably busy for quite a while in Canada (Ontario, BWRX-300) because they never worked together, while GE is being divided after a major loss of revenue ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Electric https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Electric ).
KEPCO (Korea) may be interested in deals, but some european nations may not be enthusiastic.
Another potential candidate is Rosatom, but which European nation is willing to sign with Russia, especially after its inept move in Ukraine?
China? Maybe, albeit reserves are probably even higher than towards Korea: their recent efforts towards UK weren't well-received nor conclusive, and they are busy obtaining mediocre results at home.
Canada may be able to propose but didn't build for quite a time, has its specific architecture (CANDU) and now prefers to target a SMR.
SMRs may be an option, but at best in 2030 (Rolls-Royce's announces it), and with the usual "let's someone else suffer with the first project then wait to be quite sure" will add latency. Moreover SMRs amplify the NIMBY effect.
Who/what else?
We more and more know how to build 'renewables', and less and less know how to build nuclear.
- trashtester 4y ago> https://ourworldindata.org/battery-price-decline https://ourworldindata.org/battery-price-decline If the price of batteries continues to decline exponentially, then absolutely, renewables will be great. I don't they will be 4x cheaper per decade going forward, though. Maybe 2x cheaper per decade for a few more decades is more likely, if so 2050 might be a break-even point. > Complement: V2G will be a key, here. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vehicle-to-grid https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vehicle-to-grid V2G can absolutely make some contribution for very short-term fluctuations (such as for from Nuclear ramp up/down cycles, but the capacity several orders of magnitude too small to compensate for a few weeks of almost no wind in the North Sea. > Prices fluctuations? Yes. The extreme price fluctuations seen this winter (both from day-to-day, but also compared to earlier years) is due to coming very close to reaching max capacity. For Norwegian consumers, this is already extremely sticky, since many households are experiencing increased costs of $1000-$2000 per month (more in some cases), even after government subsidies. Also, the reservoirs in the hydro systems are already unusually low. so next year may be worse. I don't think any Norwegian government will survive that. In other words, Denmark should expect that at some point soon, Norway will shut down exports until the situation has normalized. >> Denmark imports 17% of their consumption > Denmark officially targets 84% electricity wind by 2035. What happens to Danmark's electricity market if they are no longer able to import power from Norway and Sweden? > This is mainly a financial matter. A 'cooperation' achieved thru a market lets some buy production surpluses on the spot market at a bargain, store them then sell with a profit wipes out such outrage. You would be right if Norway were able to coordinate that internally in ways that did not hurt the population. But in Norway, since electricity is used for heating (and it is cold here). That would have to mean a setup where households were able to buy electricity at prices close to the historical prices, in other words, it would require us to do the very thing that stops a market from working. We could still sell excess production (after reservoir levels return to "safe), and could also offer foreign energy companies to "rent" available storage in our hydro systems. But being a full member of the open energy market simply doesn't work for Norway at these price levels. It's kind of being members of an open market for food when your population is starving, even if you're a net exporter. (I'm sure Denmark would strangle food exports, if the price became so high that danes could no longer afford to eat.) > Yes, a very low LCOE offers financial provisions for the infrastructure (grid, storage...). Renewable sources' LCOE is low and falls sharply. Nuclear-produced electricity cost, on the other hand, is way higher and raises. Surprises (real building costs, waste management, decommission, accident...) may further extend the gap. The prices of nuclear is caused by political choices. With rational (or only sightly paranoid) regulations, nuclear would be a lot cheaper. > The current (awful) nuclear-building capacity needs a miracle to adjust. You may be right. Still, there are a lot more pro-nuclear people now, than when I advocated for nuclear 15 years ago. > A continental mix reduces this need. Not below "several days". Also, long distance energy transfers are expensive, and require massive investments in infrastructure. Not only that, it depends on a lot of countries participating. Maybe Greece has other ideas? > The last Korean president was against nuclear and practically froze it in Korea. The newly elected president is pro-nuclear, though. I'm aware of some shady dealings with earlier plants, but I didn't see any good argument that it shifted the cost enought to really matter for the long term electricity price. > Nuclear isn't emission free (building, obtaining the fuel, waste management, decommission... aren't emission-free). True, but the same goes for all other energy sources, and Nuclear seem to have lower emissions than all "renewable" sources, as far as I can tell from your link. > In any case who will build them? I said ideal, meaning that should be the goal. Every movement toward that goal would be positive. 30% is much better than going to 15%. However, if there really is will to do it, it absolutely can be done. Unless there is some extreme event (such as a Russian nuke landing in Poland), Europe is unlikely to act with such resolve, though. > We more and more know how to build 'renewables' Yes, but like with nuclear, there is a lot of fudging the number even when not accounting for storage needs. And for the storage part, all we have is some kind of hope that it will become cheap enough in the future. And without enough storage, Northern Europe is almost at "Peak Renewable" already (and Southern Europe doesn't seem very interested). For every new windmill we build from now on (without storage), we are going to add to price fluctuations, meaning that the sales price for wind (before subsidies) will be reduced for each mill. Being about 30 times lower than natural gas (without carbon capture) is only a rounding error away from zero, imo.