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I take it all the way _down_ to the reduction basis, which is the only place where all of this matters. When a biologist says that a bacterium exists, they are

I take it all the way _down_ to the reduction basis, which is the only place where all of this matters. When a biologist says that a bacterium exists, they are making a descriptive statement, not an ontological one. To say that a bacterium exists is just a convenient proxy to refer to a specific aggregate as a whole. A bacterium is always reducible to its constituents, therefore has no ontological status nor existence in and of itself: in other words, if the molecules which the bacterium is made of would relinquish their structural integrity, the bacterium would cease to "exist" too. Therefore I would agree with you that it's totally legitimate for a scientist to claim that a bacterium exists, in so far as we understand this claim as a descriptive proxy. A shorthand, essentially, to cluster together specific configurations of the underlying, supposedly more real, "stuff". And this is needed, if we want to make any progress. We have to communicate, effectively and succinctly. Science is precisely about _descriptions_ and predictions of behavior. Same goes with the paleontologist example. It's a completely different matter instead to claim ontological status, that is, to say that something exists in and of itself, irreducible to something else, as a building block of the universe. This is a philosophical stance per-force, since the scientific method cannot follow us there. It's meta-physics by definition, and there are different rules at play there. Not Popper's falsifiability, but empirical adequacy, internal consistency, explanatory power, etc. So when scientists claim that the ontological primitive is, e.g., the quantum field, or "energy" or anything really, they are stepping soundly and firmly into philosophy. Which is totally fine to do. We just need to be aware of this, and start to apply different rules to evaluate the validity of the claims. Edits are typos.

boole1854 4y ago
I see. Now I understand that when earlier you were adding the "in and of itself" qualifier to "exists", you meant the same thing by what I would call "exists at an ontologically fundamental level". I agree with that. However, note that in my original post I didn't claim that physical laws describe what exists at an ontologically fundamental level, just what exists in reality. And by that I mean "exists" in the non-subjective way that, say, hydrogen atoms exist. I wouldn't mean to imply that hydrogen atoms are irreducible. Does Deutsch and his research group make claims to know what is ontologically irreducible? Not as far as I know, but I am open to correction!

boole1854 4y ago

I see. Now I understand that when earlier you were adding the "in and of itself" qualifier to "exists", you meant the same thing by what I would call "exists at an ontologically fundamental level". I agree with that. However, note that in my original post I didn't claim that physical laws describe what exists at an ontologically fundamental level, just what exists in reality. And by that I mean "exists" in the non-subjective way that, say, hydrogen atoms exist. I wouldn't mean to imply that hydrogen atoms are irreducible. Does Deutsch and his research group make claims to know what is ontologically irreducible? Not as far as I know, but I am open to correction!